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Abstract
A growing awareness of the prominent role the environment plays in multi-agent systems has led to gradual
acceptance of its importance by the multi-agent system community in general. Within this line of research,
we propose a new class of games, called Multi-Games. A Multi-game is one in which a given number of
players play a fixed finite number of basic games simultaneously. The basic games in a multi-game can be
regarded as different environments for the players, and, in particular, we submit that multi-games can be used
to model investment in multiple national and continental markets within a global economy. Furthermore, when
the players’ weights for different games in the multi-game are classed as private information or as types with
given conditional probability distributions, we obtain a particular class of Bayesian games.
The main contribution of this thesis is to illustrate how, for the class of so-called completely pure regular multi-
games with finite sets of types, the Nash equilibria of the basic games can be used to compute a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in multi-games, with complexity independent of the number of types. Following the presentation
of the main results, the thesis presents two algorithms that allow us to establish whether we have a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium which can be determined with lower computational complexity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the opening chapter of this thesis, we briefly talk about game theory, multi-agent sys-
tems and then introduce a new class of games, called multi-games, in which a given
number of players play a fixed finite number of basic games simultaneously. We then
expand on these in the following chapters and explain game theory in more detail as well
as discuss in more depth the multi-games. We will then explain the motivation and back-
ground to the work, before discussing the contribution of this research respectively. In
Section 1.5, we discuss related work. In the last section of this chapter, we provide a
guide to the thesis.
1.1 Game Theory
Game theory is the academic study of conflict and cooperation between two or more independent,
self-interested and rational players (agents). Rational players aim towards very specific goals when
making any choice. Players may be groups or individuals or a combination of these.
Game theory furnishes a framework for communication between players and a formulation and anal-
ysis of their strategies [TS01, OR94]. In other words, game theory refers to the study of decision-
making between people when decisions are reliant upon each other. This forms part of a highly
academic sector within applied mathematics, even though the term might sound somewhat playful.
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Game theory allows us to effectively analyse, create, plan, and gain insight into situations in which a
strategy might be used [Per12,MSZ13]. Game theory is the most comprehensive interaction theory
to date [Sho08].
In 1838, Antoine Cournot conducted one of the earliest formal game-theoretic analyses. Game theory
was originally introduced to model the behaviour of rational agents whereby players make inde-
pendent decisions in order to maximise their utility or payoff in an economy [NM44]. Further en-
hancements to the field were undertaken in 1950 by John Nash, who demonstrated that finite games
always have an equilibrium point, at which all players can choose actions that are best for them given
their opponents’ choices [Nas50]. Since 1950, game theory has been applied in economic theories,
sociology, psychology, philosophy, biology, military applications, politics and networks [MSZ13].
Recently, game theory has become a common and pervasive occurrence in computer science. Artifi-
cial intelligence, e-commerce, and networking are just a few computer science fields in which game
theory has become an inherent component. Game theory also applies to the internet, which requires
the development of systems that encompass more than one entity and are associated with specific
information and interests.
“Game theory is a sort of umbrella or ‘unified field’ theory for the rational side of social science,
where ‘social’ is interpreted broadly, to include human as well as non-human players (computers,
animals, plants).”(Yisrael Aumann 1987)
The algorithmic game theory has emerged as a result of the integration of the computational approach
with game theoretical models [NRTV07]. The algorithmic game theory and multi-agent systems are
both important research areas in Artificial Intelligence.
1.2 Multi-Agent System and Multi-Games
A multi-agent system is formed of a number of independent entities known as agents, that engage in
mutual interaction in order to pursue individual interests (Competition), achieve a common objective
(Collaboration) and negotiate with each other [SL09].
Traditional artificial intelligence has been concerned with developing models of particular facets of
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individual agents; by contrast, multi-agent system addresses the interplay among different agents
which exhibit several characteristics, including autonomy of action (Autonomous), response to phe-
nomena in their surrounding environment (Reactive), own initiative as catalyst for action (Proactive),
and interaction with other agents (Social) [Woo09,WJ95].
Multi-agent systems research employs many techniques to model and investigate different facets of
agents, for example classical logic, non-monotonic logic reasoning and even machine learning. Re-
cently, multi-agent systems research has been aided by the tools and techniques of game theory,
particularly when applied to problems such as negotiations [Woo09]. Indeed, due to the solid math-
ematical basis of game theory, in modelling interactions among self interested agents, it has been a
predominant theoretical tool in use for analysis of multi-agent systems [Woo09].
Because of the interactive relationship between the agents in a multi-agent system, the actions of one
agent may have repercussions for the others as well. Game theory can be applied to model this in-
terplay and it has been used as a very popular technique in multi-agent systems. Due to the general
acceptance that most agents in multi-agent systems are self interested, there has been a great increase
in interest in the application of game theory and its models to multi-agent systems, particularly when
involving self-interested agents or players. Game theoretic work initially entered the multi-agent sys-
tem’s literature as a result of Jeffrey Rosenchein and colleagues’ work [PW02]. Although multi-agent
systems comprise the greater part of game-theoretic work, the scope of multi-agent systems is sig-
nificantly broad, incorporating non-game-theoretic subjects like models of software engineering and
logical reasoning regarding the perspectives and goals of other agents, sharing of tasks, argumenta-
tion, distributed sensing, and coordination between multiple agents [EL10,LS08,Woo09,SL09].
A growing awareness of the prominent role the environment plays in multi-agent systems has led to
gradual acceptance of its importance by the multi-agent system community in general [WHHS09].
Suppose a multi-agent system in which agents interact together simultaneously within many environ-
ments. A concept is needed to act as a model, which can be applied to this multi-agent system as a
representation of the players or agents interacting together simultaneously in many different environ-
ments.
For the purpose of this research, we introduce a new class of games, called multi-games which can
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be used to model economic, human or technological behaviour, where each agent can allocate its
resources in varying proportions to play in a number of different environments simultaneously, each
representing a basic game in its own right. Each agent can have the same set of strategies for the
different basic games. The payoff for each agent in a multi-game is assumed to be the convex linear
combination of payoffs obtained for the basic games, weighted by the proportions allocated to them (A
convex combination is defined as a linear combination 1x1+  +NxN of the vectors x1; x2; : : : ; xN
where i 2 [0; 1];
PN
i=1 i = 1).
In the multi-games, each basic game is the environment in which the agents, or players interact in.
In particular, we submit that multi-games can be used to model investment in multiple national and
continental markets within a global economy, where agents have to interact in different environments
at the same time, though it can also be applied to any multi-agent system where a number of agents
are interacting simultaneously within a number of environments.
In other words, the purpose of using this model is to add a new dimension to the description of a range
of situations, achieved through the employment of game theoretic models. This is done by linearly
combining the payoff matrices of various games and linking them through the use of a type for each
agent, which represents the amount of investment that an agent is willing to commit in that particular
game.
Next, we provide an example of multi-games in the case of investment in a global economy with
different national or continental markets.
Example 1.1. (Battle in Smart phones Market)
Consider twomultinational smart-phone producer companies which can invest in the national econom-
ies of the US, EU and China as the world’s largest market for smart-phones with different cost of
investment, advertising, rates of profit, labour value, interest rates, etc. Suppose that they need to
decide in what ratio to divide their funds for investment in the three regions and, in addition, whether
to enter into a particular venture or not. We thus have three games, G1 for US, G2 for EU and G3 for
China, one for each national economy, each with two players and two strategies for entering (E) and
not entering (E 0). Let uij denote the payoff function for player i in Gj (with i = 1; 2 and j = 1; 2; 3).
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Suppose that the first player invests 11, 12 and 13 = 1   11   12 fractions of its funds in US,
EU and China respectively, and assume that 21, 22 and 23 = 1   21   22 are the corresponding
fractions for the second player, see Figure 1.1.
North America Market
13
Europe Market
12
China Market
11
(a) Fractions for Producer 1, 11 + 12 + 13 = 1
North America Market
23
Europe Market
22
China Market
21
(b) Fractions for Producer 2, 21 + 22 + 23 = 1
Figure 1.1: Illustration of an example of the fractions of two multinational companies’ funds in US, EU and China.
Thus, the payoff to the first player for the strategy profiles (X1; Y1) in G1, (X2; Y2) in G2 and (X3; Y3)
in G3, with Xj; Yj 2 fE;E 0g for j = 1; 2; 3, would be
11u11(X1; Y1) + 12u12(X2; Y2) + 13u13(X3; Y3);
whereas the payoff for the second player for the same strategy profile would be
21u21(X1; Y1) + 22u22(X2; Y2) + 23u23(X3; Y3):
1.3 Motivation and Background
The structure of a multi-game is based on a model named double game. In 2010, Edalat introduced
a new game framework called double game, which combines a standard dilemma and a social game.
Consequently, research has been done by Ounsley on the double game utilising the concept of Nash
equilibrium and by Ghoroghi on an application of the double game [Oun10,Gho10].
The idea of multi-games originated following research for an application of double games and we
generalised the idea of a double game to multi-games following the unpublished paper [EGS12]. In
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this research, we generalised definitions of double game and proved some new theorems. We then
present two algorithms for both double and multi games that allow us to establish whether we have a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium which can be determined with lower computational complexity. The al-
gorithm for multi-games determines this with a lower computational complexity which is polynomial
in M for a given N . Multi-games are more realistic in real-world socio-economic contexts and the
study of multi-games may exhibit interesting results in comparison to double games.
Furthermore the idea of changing types in a multi-game seemed more appealing. Therefore, we
pursued this line of research into how changes in the types affect and induce changes in the Nash
equilibrium set for multi-games. Changes in types might result from changes in information, prefer-
ences, or might result from errors in identifying the types of the other player. A player might receive
new information and s/he might then reconsider the type s/he had originally chosen. Obviously a
change affecting the types of one player might produce a new game with a new Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, in order to be considered useful in predicting its economic behaviour, an equi-
librium strategy for players must lend itself to effective computation. The main problem is that the
computational complexity of obtaining the Nash equilibrium becomes greater with the increase in the
number of features. This means that the players cannot derive any advantages even with the identi-
fication of equilibrium. Such an equilibrium strategy for players can only be useful for determining
or predicting economic behaviour if it can be efficiently computed. Clearly, if the computation of a
Nash equilibrium is unfeasible because of its high complexity, then its existence, despite having theo-
retical significance, has no value in practice. It is thus useful to have models in game theory for which
the computation of a Nash equilibrium can be more efficiently done than in general. Therefore, we
pursued this line of research attempting to reduce the computational complexity in order to establish
whether we have a Bayesian Nash equilibrium which can be determined.
1.4 Contributions of The Thesis
• This research introduces multi-games as a new form of game. In multi-games, a given number
of players divide up their resources according to different weights over a given number of
games, which are then played out simultaneously. All players play at the same time but each
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can use the same set of strategies for the games. Players use a particular assortment of weights,
one for each of the games. Combined, these signify the percentage of the players’ investment in
each of the games. The convex combination of the payoff a player acquires in the games, along
with the assigned weights, makes up a player’s total payoff. Each of the games can be thought
of as being an alternate environment for the players. It is our suggestion that investments in
various continental and national markets in a worldwide economy can be represented using
multi-games.
• A class of Bayesian games is achieved when the players’ weights for certain multi-games in-
volve private information or types that have certain conditional probability distributions. We
show that for the class of so-called completely pure regular multi-games and with finite sets of
types, the Nash equilibria of the basic games can be used to compute a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium in multi-games with complexity independent of the number of types. We developed two
algorithms in order to establish whether we have a Bayesian Nash equilibrium which can be
determined with lower computational complexity.
1.5 Related Work
Our construction of the multi-games is a novel approach in the game theory field. At first glance, an
N-player multi-game may seem similar to poly-matrix games [Yan68], but is dissimilar in structure.
This is discussed further in Section 3.2. Also, we show that the double game, as an instance of multi-
games, provides a generalisation of the altruistic extension in [CKKS11] which can be considered as
a double game with the first game identified as the original game and the second game as a symmetric
altruistic game in Chapter 5.
Hypergame theory which can be thought of as a linked set of games [BD79], is used to reason on
two or more perspectives of a competitive situation. Both enemy capability and possible intent can
be recorded in a parsimonious notation called the Hypergame Normal Form. Hypergame theory
abandons the assumption of perfect knowledge where one player can perceive options for himself.
Thus each player makes a rational decision according to its own perception of the game. Therefore
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in a Hypergame it may seem as if two games are played, these are each player’s subjective game both
leading to actions in the real game which gives payoffs [Van00,VL02].
Drama theory, developed by [How71,Bry03] follows in the path of hypergames in allowing the dif-
fering perceptions by each player. It also allows players to change their preferences during the game.
This can be used to simulate responses during the course of a game which results in change following
change until the game is over or certain actions become necessary. A drama unfolds through episodes
in which characters interact. An episode goes through phases of scene-setting, build-up, climax and
decision. Finally comes the action that sets up the next episode. This has been used for defence,
political and commercial relations since the early 90s.
Another similar field is concurrent games, which are a form of game semantics [AM99]. This was
designed to overcome the problems in sequential forms of game semantics for linear logic. Game
semantics is used to model interactions between a system and its environment, so one player in the
game represents the system as a proponent and the other the environment as the opponent. This
sequential format however has very limitative consequences. Abramsky created a new form called
concurrent games which allowed the players to act “in a distributed, asynchronous fashion”, taking
notice of each other only when they choose to. These games no longer follow the normal format of
logical games.
Playing simultaneous games to test different strategies is also related to ideas in evolutionary game
theory. Nash doctoral dissertation contains a seminal idea that equilibrium of a game can be under-
stood either as the rational behaviour of a fixed group of individuals, or as the not necessarily rational,
but average behaviour of a population of individuals. John Maynard Smith revived the idea in a bi-
ological setting where the players are competing species that possess different strategies [Smi82].
Each individual in a habitat competes in interspecies scenarios which can be thought of as two player
games. This comes from an assumption that all members of the same species are irrational and can be
generalised as one player [You11]. In each game however there are different payoffs for each player
depending on the opponent species and the variation within each species which leads to evolution.
This links evolutionary game theory to two player games with varying payoffs as a large popula-
tion of individuals who are recurrently and uniformly randomly matched in pairs, play a finite and
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symmetric two-player game.
1.6 A Guide to the Chapters
In the next chapter, we will talk about the fundamentals of game theory. In chapter 3, we will introduce
a formal definition of the multi-game in addition to some examples of multi-games.
In chapter 4, for convenience and ease of presentation, we restrict ourselves to the class of N-player
double game in which each player has the same set of strategies in the two basic games. We later
define the class of pure regular double game, in which for pairs of extreme types there are 2N pure
Nash equilibrium in which the strategy of each player only depends on its own type. Similarly, for a
double game with `i types for each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng, we define the notion of a completely
pure regular double game where there are `1      `i      `N pure Nash equilibrium for all
possible pairs of types of N players in which the strategy of each player only depends on its own
type. We then derive an algorithm for establishing that a double game is completely pure regular with
complexity independent of the number of the types and actions. We also show that a pure Bayesian
equilibrium for a completely pure regular double game can be obtained directly from this algorithm,
thus reducing the complexity of computation.
Chapter 5 will present an example where we apply this framework to obtain a double game extension
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in order to model pro-social behaviour. In this double game of Prisoner’s
Dilemma, the first game is the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma and the second game captures the social
or moral gain for cooperation for each player. Furthermore, we consider the double game for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma where the social (altruistic) coefficient of each player forms a finite discrete set
of incomplete information or types thus giving rise to a Bayesian game.
In chapter 6, we introduce N-player multi-games with M games and define the class of pure regular
multi-game and a completely pure regular multi-game. We then present an algorithm that allows
us establish whether we have a Bayesian Nash equilibrium which can be determined with lower
computational complexity.
Chapter 7 will introduce the computer program which has been developed on the basis of the proposed
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algorithms and we will discuss the results of analysing these algorithms for a various number of types,
players and games.
In Chapter 8, we will discuss some attempts to compare various strategies in a round-robin tour-
nament of the double game for Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which the players can change their social
coefficients incrementally from one round to the next. In the last chapter, chapter 9, we will conclude
the discussion and highlight future works.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we briefly talk about the fundamentals of game theory besides some ex-
amples to clarify them. The end of this chapter contains a short overview of Robinson-
Goforth topology of 2 2 Games.
2.1 Game Theory Definitions
Within the decision theory, a game refers to a strategic interaction [OR94] and so game theory is “the
formal study of decision-making where several players must make choices that potentially affect the
interests of the other players” [TS01]. Game theory contains a number of important key words:
• Utility; Under utility theory, the participants’ decisions or predilections influence the values
assigned to certain results. It has been proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenster [NM44] that
the results can be given substitute numbers in order to ensure that a rational individual making
a decision will consistently be able to choose the optimal expected utility.
• Rationality; The idea is that each agent is rational under game theory. The objective of each
agent is to achieve the optimal expected value of his/her payoff [NM44].
In terms of player i’s payoff, we are referring to one of the two following situations:
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• Nature and every other player have selected their strategies and the game has finished. Utility
for player i is then received; or
• Player i’s expected utility, obtained by her/him as a function of the strategies s/he and the other
players selected.
Overall, games can be categorised as shown in Figure 2.1:
Game Taxonomy
Cooperative games or
Non-cooperative games
Extensive form games or
Strategic form games
Complete information games or
Incomplete information games
Figure 2.1: Illustration of important game categories.
Coalitional or cooperative, this type of game forms payoffs that are achievable for potential teams if
they choose to work together. Games are examined in terms of the relationships between participants
under cooperative game theory. On the other hand, Non-cooperative game theory selects payoffs
based on the evaluation of strategic choices regarding the sequence of participants’ decisions and
actions. Under the non-cooperative game theory, two fundamental approaches are utilised: extensive
form game, and strategic form or normal form game.
Extensive form games can be illustrated through game trees. Figure 2.2 represents an example of an
extensive game with two players. Each player has an action set comprised of two actions. Player 1
can choose z or u and player 2 can select between v or w.
Player1
(a; b)
v
(c; d)
w
z
(e; f)
v
(g; h)
w
u
Player2
Information Set
Figure 2.2: Illustration of a game tree.
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Definition 2.1. [NGNP09] (Extensive Form Game). An extensive form game G is defined as a tuple
hI; (Ai)i2I ;H; P; (ui)i2Ii, where I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng is a finite set of players; A1; A2; : : : ; AN are
the action sets of player i 2 I , respectively; H is the set of all terminal nodes (terminal histories).
P : t! I where t =2 H is a mapping that associates node t to player i and ui : H ! R as a function
of the terminal node reached, called the utility functions (payoff functions).
An information set illustrates every possible move that could have been made during the game up to
a given node, based on what that player has seen.
Definition 2.2. [NGNP09] (Strategic Form Game). A strategic form game or normal (static) form
game G is defined as a tuple hI; (Si)i2I ; (ui)i2Ii, where I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng is a finite set of players;
S1; S2; : : : ; SN are the strategy sets of the players i 2 I , respectively; and ui : S1S2  SN ! R
are mappings called the utility functions.
Figure 2.3 represents an example of 2 2 game, The four outcomes for each table are represented by
the four cells of the matrix. Player one controls the choice between z and u, and player 2, between v
and w. The players choices then determine the outcome of the game. The corresponding cell to the
choices contains each player’s payoff, represented by two numbers, for players 1 and 2 respectively.
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (3; 6) (0; 7)
u (0; 4) (3; 5)
Figure 2.3: Payoff matrix: standard notation for the strategic form.
All games can be categorised as follows:
• Complete information games; A game can be thought of as a complete information game when
each player has the same level of knowledge (or more) as the players who have already acted
in each move.
• Incomplete information games. When the player has less knowledge that those who have al-
ready acted, it is considered to be incomplete information.
The following two game types fall under the category of complete information games:
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• Perfect information: Here, the players know everything that has happened previously in the
game (i.e. all other players’ actions). All the players also hold full payoff knowledge of their
own and other players’ payoffs.
• Imperfect information: Here, players do not know everything, but some things that have hap-
pened previously in the game, and they do not know of every action taken previously by the
other players. However, all players know every payoff that could be achieved.
As many factors are influenced by the relationship between players’ planned actions and expectations,
we usually use the word “strategy” (which can be thought of as a function or mapping) instead of
“action”. In the case of strategy we refer to pure strategy in order to distinguish them from mixed
strategies, which are randomizations over pure strategies. Given a player i with Si as the set of pure
strategies, a mixed strategy i for player i is a probability distribution over Si. That is, i : Si ! [0; 1]
assigns to each pure strategy si 2 Si, a probability i(si) such that
P
si2Si i(si) = 1. The probability
of a pure strategy profile (combination) (s1; : : : ; sN) is (s1; : : : ; sN) =
Q
i2I i(si) [NGNP09].
All players are assumed to be rational and therefore they choose the strategies which are desirable for
them, with respect to what the other players do. Thus, each player’s predicted strategy must be that
player’s best response to the predicted strategies of the other players.
Definition 2.3. [Ras06](Best response) The best response for player i 2 I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng in a
normal form game G to the strategies s i chosen by the other players is strategy si 2 BRi(s i) if
there exists another strategy s0i of player i such that
BRi(s i) = fsi 2 Sijui(si; s i)  ui(s0i; s i) 8s0i 2 Sig = argmaxsi2Si ui(si; s i)
for each si 2 Si. BRi(s i) is a set and BRi : S i ! Si.
A strategy is dominated if it is not the best response strategy whatever the strategy choice of the
opposition. Predictions are easy when there are dominant strategies. A dominant strategy for a
player is one that produces the highest payoff of any strategy available for every possible action by
the other players [HV95]. Now we present some definitions regarding dominance in game theory.
Definitions 2.4 to 2.7 are taken from [Ras06].
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Definition 2.4. Strategy si dominates another possible strategy s0i of player i if ui(si; s i)  ui(s0i; s i);
8 s i 2 S i and ui(si; s0 i) > ui(s0i; s0 i) for some s0 i 2 S i.
Definition 2.5. (Dominant strategy) Strategy si is dominant if si dominates another possible strategy
s0i of player i, 8s0i 6= si.
Definition 2.6. Strategy si strictly dominates another possible strategy s0i of player i if ui(si; s i) >
ui(s
0
i; s i); 8 s i 2 S i.
Definition 2.7. (Strictly dominant strategy) Strategy si is strictly dominant if si strictly dominates
another possible strategy s0i of player i, 8s0i 6= si.
Dominant strategies do not always exist, and then we can turn to notions of equilibrium. Nash equilib-
rium appears when the only criteria is that every decision made by a player is the best response to the
other players’ best response strategies. The notion of Nash equilibrium has become the key concept
in game theory since John Nash’s celebrated proof of the existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium for
all finite games in 1950 [Nas50]. In the following sections, we discuss the notion of Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies and mixed strategies.
2.2 Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
Definition 2.8. [NGNP09] Consider G = hI; (Si)i2I ; (ui)i2Ii, a strategic form game, where I =
f1; 2; : : : ; Ng is a finite set of players. The strategy profile (vector) s = (s1; s2; : : : ; sN) can be
recognised as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G if
ui(si; s i)  ui(s0i; s i)
for all s0i 2 Si and for all players i. In other words, pure strategy profile s = (s1; s2; : : : ; sN) is a
Nash equilibrium if each si is a best response to s i.
Definition 2.9. [Ras06] (-Nash). Fix  > 0. A strategy profile s = (s1; : : : ; sN) is an -Nash
equilibrium if, for all players i and for all strategies s0i 6= si; ui(si; s i)  ui(s0i; s i)  .
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2.3 Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
A strategic form game, may not involve a Nash equilibrium but instead requires that players choose
pure strategies with given probabilities. It also requires that players act rationally. Mixed strategy is a
probability distribution over pure strategies.
Definition 2.10. [NGNP09] Let G = hI; (Si)i2I ; (ui)i2Ii, be strategic form game with finite set
of strategies of each player i 2 I where I = f1; 2 ; : : : ; Ng. Given a player i with Si as the set
of pure strategies, a mixed strategy i for player i is a probability distribution over Si, i : Si !
[0; 1] and ui(1; : : : ; N) =
P
(s1;:::;sN )2S (s1; : : : ; sN)ui(s1; : : : ; sN). A mixed strategy profile  =
(1; : : : ; N) is a Nash equilibrium if 8i 2 I ,
ui(i;  i)  ui(0i;  i)
for all 0i 2M(Si) whereM(Si) is the set of possible mixed strategies available to player i.
Theorem 2.1. [Nas50](Nash’s Theorem) Let G = hI; (Si)i2I ; (ui)i2Ii be a finite strategic form game
where I = f1; 2 ; : : : ; Ng is finite and Si is finite for each player i. Then G has at least one mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium.
2.4 Bayesian Game
Private information for each player refers to confidential data that is not known by any other mem-
ber [NGNP09]. The player’s private information is what defines the type of the player. Each player
can be of several types where a type is to be thought of as a full description of the player’s beliefs.
This can include beliefs regarding game information (the ‘state of nature’), beliefs held regarding the
’state of nature’ viewpoints of the other players, and so on. In 1968, John Harsanyi [Har68] proposed
Bayesian form games to represent incomplete information games. Harsanyi suggested that a method
for solving games with incomplete information is by transforming it into a game with imperfect infor-
mation, in which a probability distribution for each unknown value, referred to as a type, is provided.
The Harsanyi’s transformation essentially entails the following stages:
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• Within the strategic decision scenario, all asymmetric information should be represented in
terms of the way in which profiles of actions influence utility payoffs.
• Transform the above model on the realisation of random variables where the ex-ante probability
distribution before the vector of types is chosen is common knowledge among all the players.
Aumann [Aum76] defined: “A fact is common knowledge among the players if every player
knows it and every player knows that every player knows it, and so on”.
Definition 2.11. [FT91] (Bayesian game) A Bayesian form game G is defined as a tuple G = hI;; S;
p; ui, I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng and  = i2Ii, where i is the type space (the set of types) of player i.
S = i2ISi where Si is the set of available strategies to player i. S is called “states of the world” .
p :  ! [0; 1] and pi is a (discrete) probability function specifying i’s belief about the type of other
players given his own type. u = (u1; : : : ; un), where ui : S   ! R is the utility function (payoff
utility) for player i.
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is also the basis of games with incomplete information as shown by
Harsanyi in 1960’s [Har95]. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian normal
form game [AH02].
Definition 2.12. [FT91] A Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a game G of incomplete information with
a finite number of types i for each player i 2 I , a prior distribution p, and pure strategy spaces Si is
the Nash equilibrium of the “expanded game” in which each player i’s space of pure strategies is the
set Sii of strategy maps from i to Si i.e. si(:) : i ! Si. A pure strategy for player i is a function
si(:) : i ! Si that specifies a pure action si(i), which is what i will choose when his type is i.
Given a strategy profile s(:) and an s0i(:) 2 Sii , let (s0i(:); s i(:)) denote the profile where player i
plays s0i(:) and the other players follow s(:), and let
 
s0i(i); s i( i)

=
 
s1(1); : : : ; si 1(i 1); s0i(i); si+1(i+1); : : : ; sN(N)

denote the value of this profile at  = (i;  i). Then, strategy profile s(:) is a pure Bayesian equilib-
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rium of G if and only if, for all i 2 I and all i 2 i such that p(i) > 0,
si(:) 2 argmaxs0i(:)2Sii
X
i
X
 i
p(i;  i)ui
 
s0i(i); s i( i); (i;  i)

or
si(i) 2 argmaxs0i2Si
X
 i
p( iji)ui
 
s0i; s i( i); (i;  i)

(2.1)
for all s0i 2 Si. Given p(1; : : : ; N), Bayes rule can be used to measure conditional distribution
p( iji), referring to player i’s belief regarding the other players’ type distribution.
pi( iji) = p( i; i)
p(i)
=
p( i; i)P
 i2 i
p( i; i)
:
Note that actions and strategies in the Bayesian game context are used in different ways. A strategy
for a player i is defined as a mapping from i to Si where a strategy si of a player i specifies a pure
action for each type of player i. The notation si(:) refers to the pure action of player i corresponding
to an arbitrary type from his type set.
There is also a definition for mixed Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games, which holds for the general
case of continuous type i for player i 2 I where I = f1; 2 ; : : : ; Ng is finite.
Definition 2.13. [OR94] In a game G of incomplete information with a finite number of types i for
each player i 2 I , and pure strategy spaces Si, we denote the set of mixed strategies over the strategy
set  by M(Si). A mixed strategy is a function i : i ! M(Si) that specifies a lottery i(i)
for each of i’s possible types i 2 i. A strategy profile  2 M(Si) is a mixed strategy Bayesian
equilibrium of G if and only if, for all i 2 I and all i 2 i, such that p(i) > 0,
i(i) 2 argmax0i2M(Si)
X
 i
p( iji)ui
 
0i;  i( i); (i;  i)

for all 0i 2M(Si).
Theorem 2.2. Every finite game of incomplete information possesses at least one Bayesian Nash
equilibrium [JR06].
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Every finite Bayesian game of incomplete information admits a mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
We provide three examples of an incomplete information game, followed by the identification of the
games’ Bayesian Nash equilibria and mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Example 2.1. Consider a game with two players. Each player has a strategy set with two actions.
Player 1 knows that player 2 has two possible types (the world has two possible states).
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
I = f1; 2g;
S1 = fz; ug;
S2 = fv; wg;
1 = f11g;
2 = f12; 22g;
p(12j11) = 0:7; p(22j11) = 0:3; p(11j12) = p(11j22) = 1:
(ui)i2I are given in Figure 2.4.
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (3; 5) (0; 4)
u (0; 7) (3; 6)
(a) 12
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (3; 6) (0; 7)
u (0; 4) (3; 5)
(b) 22
Figure 2.4: A variant of a game in which player 1 knows that player 2 has two possible types, and player 1 has only one type.
Now we use the Nash equilibrium concept in an expanded game, where each of player 2’s different
types has a different strategy. Playing v is a dominant strategy for type 12 of player 2 and playingw is a
dominant strategy for type 22 of player 2. Player 1’s expected utility by playing z is 0:73+0:30 =
2:1 and by playing u is 0:70+0:33 = 0:9, thus the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is pure strategies:
(
11#
z ;
12#
v
22#
w)
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Example 2.2. Here, we assume that each player has two possible types.
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1 = f11; 21g;
2 = f12; 22g;
p(12j11) = 0:5; p(22j11) = 0:5; p(12j21) = 0:5; p(22j21) = 0:5;
p(11j12) = 23 ; p(21j12) = 13 ; p(11j22) = 23 ; p(21j22) = 13 :
(ui)i2I=f1;2g are given in Figure 2.5.
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (1; 2) (0; 1)
u (0; 0) (1; 1)
(a) 11; 
1
2
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (1; 0) (0; 1)
u (0; 1) (1; 0)
(b) 11; 
2
2
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (0; 2) (1; 1)
u (1; 0) (0; 1)
(c) 21; 
1
2
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (0; 0) (1; 1)
u (1; 1) (0; 0)
(d) 21; 
2
2
Figure 2.5: A variant of a game in which each player is unsure of the other player’s preferences.
Here, Bayesian Nash equilibria are pure strategies:(zz; vw), (zu; vw), (uz; wv) and (uu;wv). Fig-
ure 2.6 shows the expected payoffs for types 11 and 
1
2 of player 1, and for types 
2
1 and 
2
2 of player
2.
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Figure 2.6: Illustration of expected payoffs.
Example 2.3. We present an example of a Bayesian game, and then obtain its possible mixed strategy
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Bayesian Nash equilibria. Consider a game with two players. Here, with probability 12 =
1
3
nature
decides payoff matrix as given in Figure 2.7 (a), and with probability 22 =
2
3
nature selects payoff
matrix as given in Figure 2.7 (b). Player 1 knows the choice of nature but player 2 does not. In
Figure 2.7, the probabilities of playing each strategy are shown i.e. q is the probability player 2 plays
v and p is the probability player 1 plays z with payoff matrix (a) and p0 is the probability player 1
plays z with payoff matrix (b)1.
Player 2
q (1  q)
v w
Player 1
p z (1; 1) (0; 0)
1  p u (0; 0) (0; 0)
(a) First payoff matrix - 12 =
1
3
Player 2
q (1  q)
v w
Player 1
p0 z (0; 0) (0; 0)
1  p0 u (0; 0) (2; 2)
(b) Second payoff matrix - 22 =
2
3
Figure 2.7: Payoff matrix representation for an example of mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Player 1 would play z for the first payoff matrix if 1q + 0(1  q) > 0, the results can be summarized
as:
(
q > 0 =) p = 1 (2.2)
q = 0 =) p 2 [0; 1] (2.3)
and for the second payoff matrix, player 1 would play u if 2(1  q) > 0;
(
q < 1 =) p0 = 0 (2.4)
q = 1 =) p0 2 [0; 1]: (2.5)
Player 2 would play v if:
1
3
[1p+ 0(1  p)] + 2
3
[0p0 + 0(1  p0)] > 1
3
[0p+ 0(1  p)] + 2
3
[0p0 + 2(1  p0)] =) p > 4(1  p0):
1The idea of this example has been borrowed from Guillermo Ordoñez, Notes on Bayesian Games, ECON 201B -
Game Theory, UCLA, February 1, 2006.
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Assessing player 2’s best response, the results can be summarized as:
8>>><>>>:
p = 4(1  p0) =) q 2 [0; 1] (2.6)
p > 4(1  p0) =) q = 1 (2.7)
p < 4(1  p0) =) q = 0: (2.8)
We have three cases:
• q = 0, then from 2.3 and 2.4 we have p 2 [0; 1] and p0 = 0.
From 2.8 when p0 = 0, then p < 4 which always holds that q = 0. Therefore, there are many
Bayesian Nash equilibria in which player 2 chooses w and if the first payoff matrix occurs,
player 1 chooses pz+(1  p)u, where p 2 [0; 1], and if the second payoff matrix occurs, player
1 chooses u.
• q = 1, then from 2.5 and 2.2 we have p0 2 [0; 1] and p = 1.
From 2.7 when p = 1, then p0 should be p0 > 3
4
that q = 1. Then for q = 1; p0 2 (3
4
; 1] and
p = 1, there are many Bayesian Nash equilibria in which player 2 chooses v and also player 1
chooses z if the first payoff matrix occurs and p0z + (1   p0)u, where p0 2 (3
4
; 1] if the second
payoff matrix occurs.
• q 2 (0; 1), then from 2.2 and 2.4 we have p0 = 0 and p = 1.
From 2.6, it should be the case that p = 4(1  p0), but it is impossible for p = 4(1  p0) to hold
when both p0 = 0 and p = 1. Thus this case is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2.5 Iterated Game
In reality, one discord scenario results in a consequent discord scenario. This differs from the one-
shot scenarios that occur in the game context. Therefore, it is important that an individual considers
the difference between the game context and reality when considering using game theory in reality.
Therefore, individuals must bear the consequences that decisions have on further discord scenarios
that occur later down the line rather than only taking into account the payoffs that will be received
directly after a decision has been taken. This consideration represents the repeated game. According
2.5. Iterated Game 23
to Taylor [Tay87], repeated games are a type of game in which the stage game (basic game) takes
place over a number of rounds.
Repeated games are also known as iterated games. All of these terms refer to an extensive form game,
in which there are multiple recurrences of a stage game. In repeated games with an identical group
of players, the players’ behaviour is significantly different to players’ behaviour in one-shot games.
There are two kinds of repeated games, as follows:
• Finitely repeated games, in which all players are aware of the quantity of repetitions that will
be carried out.
• Infinitely repeated games, in which the game has no known stopping point. Here, the players
behave in a way that lends itself to a never-ending game, or a game that only ceases with a
certain level of probability.
Incomplete information can be presented in repeated games, as was first illustrated by Aumann and
Maschler [Sor96]. When the game is repeated with only partial information known to all of the
players, this indicates an incomplete information repeated game. In games, it is presumed that payoff
functions and all potential strategies are known to all players. However, every potential strategy that
could be followed is not fully known to each player in reality. Additionally, since players are not aware
of certain related elements, there is no way for players to know in advance what payoff will be given
if any particular action is carried out by the players. Repeated games with incomplete information
pose a potential problem for the player, since s/he might share her/his own private information in the
process of maximising its payoffs.
Nash standard existence can be used when a game is either played once or is going to be repeated
finitely, as well as when there are a finite number of types and actions. For the infinitely repeated
game with a limit of average payoff, there is a proof of existence of Nash equilibrium with lack of
information on one side [SST02].
One of the most famous experiments for the repeated game was conducted by Axelrod [Axe84].
Axelrod studied the results of two computer-based Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments. Researchers
in a wide range of fields submitted strategies, which were then placed in a round-robin competition
24 Chapter 2. Background
to determine the best strategy. Ultimately, a Tit-for-Tat strategy, introduced by Anatol Rapoport
achieved the best score. According to this strategy, the player first cooperates and then matches the
other player’s move.
As this research concerns the most famous game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the next section will contain
further explanation about this game.
2.6 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a fundamental problem of game theory that attempts to mathematically
analyse the behaviour of individuals in a strategic situation, in which the success of each individual
does not depend entirely on one’s choice, but on the opponent’s as well [Axe84]. Essentially, it is
an abstract formulation of some common situations in which what is best for each person individu-
ally leads to mutual defection, whereas everyone would have been better off with mutual coopera-
tion [Axe84]. It has provided a tool for experimental studies in various disciplines such as economics,
social psychology, evolutionary biology and fields that are involved with the modelling of social pro-
cesses, such as behaviour in decision making [Axe84,AH81].
Each of the players competing in the Prisoner’s Dilemma has the choice to cooperate (C) or defect
(D) and the payoff values gained by the combination of the aforementioned actions are T;R; P and
S. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a non-zero-sum game where one player’s gain (or loss) does not necessarily
result in the other players’ loss (or gain). The payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is presented
in Figure 2.8.
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C (R;R) (S; T )
D (T; S) (P; P )
Figure 2.8: Payoff matrix representation for Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The values of T;R; P and S satisfy the following two inequalities:
T > R > P > S and R >
(T + S)
2
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The first equation specifies the order of the payoffs and defines the dilemma, since the best a player
can do is get T (i.e. the temptation to defect payoff when the other player cooperates), the worst a
player can do is get S (i.e. the sucker’s payoff for cooperating while the other player defects), and,
in ordering the other two outcomes, R (i.e. the reward payoff for mutual cooperation), is assumed to
be better than P (i.e. the punishment payoff for mutual defection). The second equation ensures that,
in the repeated game, the players cannot get out of the dilemma by taking turns in exploiting each
other. This means that an even chance of exploiting and being exploited is not as good an outcome
for a player as mutual cooperation. Therefore, it is assumed that R is greater than the average of T
and S [Axe84]. Finally, a special case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma occurs when the apparent advantage
of defecting over cooperating is not dependent on the opponent’s choice, and the disadvantage of the
opponent defecting over cooperating is not dependent on one’s choice, as can be illustrated in the
following equations [Axe84]:
T + S = P +R
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is considered a standard method for modelling social dilemmas [Ost07,
Shu70] and has also been used to model conditional altruistic cooperation, which has also been tested
by real monetary payoffs [Gin09]. In the 1980’s, Axelrod organised two international round-robin
tournaments in which strategies for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma competed with each other-
[Axe80a, Axe80b]. In the competition, Tit-for-Tat, i.e., cooperate on the first move and then re-
ciprocate the opponent’s last move, proved to be robust and became the overall winner of the tourna-
ments [Axe80a,Axe80b]. Axelrod then promoted Tit-for-Tat, and the four associated characteristics
of (i) be nice, (ii) reciprocate, (iii) don’t be envious, (iv) don’t be too clever, as the way reciprocal
altruism has evolved [Axe84].
Algorithmic game theory focusses on algorithmic features of games such as computational complex-
ity. In the next section, we will briefly discuss computational complexity in game theory.
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2.7 Complexity
Instead of restricting analysis to abridged abstractions, game theory enables the detailed modelling
of actual settings. This is all the more important as assessing the feasibility of a solution concept is
vital. Game theory can be defined as strategic decision-making analysis. In the context of a game, a
strategy represents a detailed plan outlining all the steps and moves needed to play the game. In the
case of a game in normal form, one fundamental problem of algorithmic game theory is the finding
of a Nash equilibrium. According to Nash’s result [Nas50, Nas51], at least one Nash equilibrium
is exhibited by each strategic game. The Nash equilibrium is useful in formulating a game strategy
and planning every possible move. One of game theory’s complexities is the result of all potential
moves. The more strategies that are possibly employed, the greater the computational complexity
will be in obtaining the Nash equilibrium, and therefore the number of strategies can be considered
as an indicator of complexity. Lemke and Howson [LH64] formulated a now well-known algorithm
for the calculation of a Nash equilibrium in two player non-zero sum games which revealed that the
complexity is no more than exponential. The computational complexity is unidentified not only in the
general case of two player non-zero sum games, but also in the case of symmetric two player games
and the pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria [NGNP09].
There are twomain categories of computational complexity, namely, those associated with a polynomial-
time algorithm and those characterised by NP-hardness. However, since Nash’s theorem specifies
that the equilibrium of each game is may be mixed, it is impossible to implement the notion of
NP-hardness to every scenario. It has become clear in a number of papers that computation of a
Nash equilibrium or even an approximate -Nash equilibrium is in general a computationally hard
problem [DGP06, EY10]. It has been proved that finding a Nash equilibrium is complete for the
complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs) [DGP06]. In the case of
Bayesian games, it is proven that determining whether a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
exists is NP-complete [CS08]. To the best of our knowledge there is not a considerable number of
research articles on computational complexity in obtaining the Nash equilibrium in the games with
incomplete information.
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Recalling the idea of changing types within multi-games, changing payoffs and then the Nash equi-
librium of a game has also been considered in [RG05]. A summary of their work is as follows:
Robinson-Goforth Topology of 2 2 Games
Robinson and Goforth introduced a classification of the 22 games with a topological structure [RG05].
They showed that 22 games can be transformed by swaps in adjoining payoff ranks. They presented
a numbering system to recognize and prioritize 144 strict ordinal games. Rapoport and Guyer [RG78]
were the first to note that, with respect to 2  2 games, there are 576 ways to arrange two sequences
of four distinct numbers in a bi-matrix (A bi-matrix is a matrix showing payoffs for both players in a
single cell). We let 0B@ R S
T P
1CA
be a matrix payoff to determine a 2  2 game. Rank ordering of the four payoff values R, S, T , P
determine the characteristics of the game. Figure 2.9 shows that each 2  2 game is characterized
by the ranking of the payoffs S, R, T and P with R = 1, P = 0. The ranking ordering partitions
the (S; T ) plane, which displays 12 symmetrical 2  2 games. Considering that we have assumed
the values of R and P to be 1 and 0 respectively, the diagram shows which game we would have
considering varying values of T and S to create regions of different inequalities. For example, where
S < 0 and T > 1, we get T > R > P > S which corresponds to the top left region and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Not all regions have been named [Hau02].
Here, we present an example of transformation according to Robinson and Goforth’s classification.
Figure 2.10 shows a transformation of Prisoner’s Dilemma to Alibi Game2. Let the payoff most
preferred by player 2 be designated with ordinal 4 in the first game. If the payoff 3 becomes more and
more attractive to player 2, it will eventually be preferred to the outcome with ordinal 4. When this
switch in preference occurs, the effect on the payoff matrix is to exchange the positions of the 3 and
4 in the matrix for player 2. Therefore, we have a new game.
Caveat: In this research, we use the word “payoff” to mean expected payoff and actual payoff, even
2Alibi game was introduced by Robinson and Goforth in 2004 as an asymmetric variant of the classic Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
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4 : Battle of Sexes
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Figure 2.9: Partitioning the (S; T ) plane, which displays 12 symmetrical 2 2 games.
Player 2
C D
Pl
ay
er
1 C (3; 3) (1; 4)
D (4; 1) (2; 2)
(a) Prisoner’s Dilemma
Player 2
C D
Pl
ay
er
1 C (3; 4) (1; 3)
D (4; 1) (2; 2)
(b) Alibi Game
Figure 2.10: Exchanges the ordinal values for the two payoffs for player 2.
though the two definitions vary. Also we focus principally on non-cooperative strategic form games
with incomplete information, which involve only a finite number of rational players, and which give
each player only a finite number of actions to choose from.
Chapter 3
Multi-Games
In this chapter, we define the multi-games. We will then discuss the difference between
a poly-matrix game and a multi-game, before going on to illustrate some examples of
multi-games in the case of double games.
3.1 Formal Definition of Multi-Games
Amulti-game is defined as follows. ConsiderM finiteN -player games Gj2J where J = f1; 2; :::;Mg
with the strategy set Sij and payoff matrix uij for player i 2 I where I = f1; 2; :::; Ng is finite, in
the game Gj . Assume that each player i is equipped with a set of M weights ij with
PM
j=1 ij = 1.
We define the multi-games N-player game G withM basic games Gj as the finite strategy game with
players i 2 I each having the strategy setQj2J Sij and payoff
ui
Y
j2J
sij

=
X
j2J
ijuij(sij)
for strategy profile sij 2 Sij and possibly incomplete information (types) ij for j 2 J . We say the
multi-game is uniform if for each player i, the set Sij is independent of the game Gj , i.e., we can write
Sij = Si, and sij = sij0 for j; j0 2 J . We assume that the values 0 and 1 will always be included in
the set of possible types for each player, which we call the extreme types. Consider that the number
of games can be different for the players, so players assign the weight 0 to some of the games.
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Here, we explain the case of the multi-game with two players and M games by using matrices of
payoffs. Assume that the strategy set for player i consists of actions si 2 Si and we denote the
weights for players 1 and 2 respectively by 1j and 2j , with j 2 J where J = f1; 2; :::;Mg. If the
payoff matrix for the basic game Gj is given as in Figure 3.1, then the payoff matrix for the multi-game
G will be given as in Figure 3.2.
Player 2
s21 s22
Player 1
s11 (a1j; a2j) (b1j; b2j)
s12 (c1j; c2j) (d1j; d2j)
Figure 3.1: Payoff matrix of the basic games.
s21 s22
s11
PM
j=1 1ja1j ,
PM
j=1 2ja2j
PM
j=1 1jb1j ,
PM
j=1 2jb2j
s12
PM
j=1 1jc1j ,
PM
j=1 2jc2j
PM
j=1 1jd1j ,
PM
j=1 2jd2j
Figure 3.2: Payoff matrix for the multi-game.
If 1j = 1, this means that the first player invests totally in the game Gj whereas when 1j = 0, the
first player does not invest anything in the game Gj . Similarly for the second player with weight 2j .
At first glance, an N-player multi-game may seem similar to poly-matrix games, therefore, in the next
section we briefly explain about poly-matrix games.
3.2 Poly-Matrix Games
A poly-matrix game [Yan68] is an N-player non-zero sum, non-cooperative game, where the utility
of each player is the sum of utilities influenced by her/his interactions with each of the N   1 other
players. In this game, each player plays a 2-player game with each other player, and her/his strategies
are the same in each of these games; the utilities are then added.
The number of players is N  2, each player i 2 I = f1; :::; Ng has a finite set of pure strategies
Si = fs1i ; :::; stii g where jSij = ti. For player i and each other player m, if player i chooses pure
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strategy ski and player m 2 I;m 6= i chooses pure strategy slm, according to [How72, ABH06], it
is possible to assign a partial payoff aimi 6=m(s
k
i ; s
l
m) for player i. If (s1; :::; sN) is the vector of pure
strategies chosen by players 1; :::; N , for any pure strategies (s1; :::; sN), the total payoff for player
i 2 I is
Ai(s1; :::; sN) =
X
i 6=m
aim(ski ; s
l
m):
Let ti  tm matrix Aim = (aklim) denote the matrix of partial payoffs to player i resulting from the
choices of pure strategies made by her/him and player m. Therefore, player i’s payoff with respect
to player m’s decisions does not depend on any other players’ strategies. In a poly-matrix game each
player i attempts to maximize her/his own total payoff by choosing a mixed strategy vector Xi over
her/his set of pure strategies such that (Xi)T = (x1i ; :::; x
ti
i ). If X = (X1; :::; XN) is a set of mixed
strategies for the N players, then the expected payoff to player i is
Ei(X) = (Xi)
T
X
m6=i
AimXm =
X
m6=i
tiX
k=1
tmX
l=1
klimx
k
i x
l
m:
According to [ABH06], the mixed strategies X = (X1 ; :::; X

i ; :::; X

N) can be recognised as a Nash
equilibrium of the poly-matrix game if and only if for any other N-tupleX = (X1 ; :::; X

i 1; Xi; X

i+1;
:::; XN),
(Xi )
T
X
m6=i
AimX

m  (Xi)T
X
m6=i
AimX

m; for i 2 N:
A poly-matrix game has at least one Nash equilibrium [Nas50]. The equilibria of a poly-matrix
was studied by Yanovskaya [Yan68] and the problem of computing an equilibrium for a poly-matrix
game has been considered by Howson [How72], Quintas [Qui89] and Eaves [Cur73]. Howson and
Rosenthal [HR74] showed the equivalence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of 2-player games with
incomplete information and a Nash equilibrium of N-player poly-matrix games. Now, we provide a
simple example of a poly-matrix game.
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Example 3.1. Consider a game with three players. Each player has a strategy set with two actions.
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
I = f1; 2g
S1 = fz; ug
S2 = fv; wg
S3 = fx; yg
Figures 3.3(a), (b) and (c) are payoff matrices for each pair of players. (ui)i2I are given in Fig-
ure 3.3(d).
Player 2
v w
Pl
ay
er
1
z (4,2) (0,3)
u (3,5) (2,4)
(a)
Player 3
x y
Pl
ay
er
1
z (4,2) (2,1)
u (3,1) (2,3)
(b)
Player 3
x y
Pl
ay
er
2
v (2,4) (2,1)
w (1,1) (3,2)
(c)
Player 2, Player 3
vx vy wx wy
Pl
ay
er
1
z (8,4,6) (6,4,2) (4,4,3) (2,6,3)
u (8,7,5) (5,7,4) (5,5,2) (4,7,5)
(d)
Figure 3.3: Payoff matrices representation for an example of poly-matrix game.
(1
2
; 1
2
)(1; 0)(0; 1) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the poly-matrix game.
In an N-player multi-game, the payoff for player i 2 I = f1; 2; :::; Ng, relative to the decision of
playerm 2 I ,m 6= i is dependent on other players’ choices. While in a poly-matrix game, the partial
payoff to player i, when player i chooses her/his strategy in connection with player m’s decision is not
correlated with any choice of strategies made by the other players.
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3.3 Some Applications of Multi-Games
Here, we explain some applications of multi-games through the use of some examples. In Chapter 5,
we will apply the framework of multi-games to obtain a double game extension of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma in order to model pro-social behaviour. We will then discuss its Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Now we present an example of a multi-game through applying transactional analysis.
Example 3.2. (Transactional analysis)
Assume that we aim to develop a model of irrational social conflict between two hostile groups in
psychological but not material war against each other. We combine ideas from transactional analysis
(a model of human interaction) using a double game in which each player is characterized by a moral
type that measures the moral consciousness of the player.
In “irrational” social conflicts, two rival groups fight each other not for any material gain but for
purely psychological reasons based on the antagonistic identities of the two groups. The question is:
How can we model such psychological war in the double game?
Sigmund Freud has established theories on human personality. Freud’s theories on modelling the
structure of personality have helped to develop what is called transactional analysis, a popularization
of classical psychoanalysis by the American psychologist Eric Berne, who maintained Freud’s notion
of personality [Ber96].
Berne describes the social interactions between people and the way they enter social games without
even being aware of this complicated process. Berne defines games as a process of interconnected
transactions that lead to a specific result for both parties in the game. Transactional analysis is funda-
mentally defined as a method of studying interaction amongst individuals.
Berne introduced three ego states. Ego states represent recurring sequences of individual human
behaviour, emotions, and cognition. The ego states are Parent, Adult and Child as described in the
following:
• Parent: Berne stated that the maximum amount of retention of events in a child’s mind is that
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of the parent because parents are the most vital people in a child’s life, hence the first ego state
is referred to as the parent.
• Child: As compared to parents, children record the sentiments or the feelings associated with
the events in their mind.
• Adult: It is known as the last ego stage. When a child is about one year old, s/he begins to
display signs of adult behaviour. For instance, s/he thinks that s/he can hold a cup of tea in
her/his hand. This behaviour develops in the child so that s/he can learn to differentiate be-
tween the child and parent’s behaviour. Berne intrinsically defines adult’s behaviour as filtering
information or data based on past experience.
Transactional analysis, as a theory, is associated with personality and explains the psychological
structure of individuals and how personality is formed in individuals. Transactional analysis is also a
communication theory, which can be used for examining different types of behaviour between indi-
viduals. Transactional analysis can be used to explain the growth of maturity in a child because the
first signs of age development in a child begin from childhood.
Interactions occurring between two or more people involve a variety of stimuli and responses that
form the core of the person’s behaviour. Figure 3.4 provides sample transactions between the parent,
adult, or child of one person and the parent, adult, or child of another (represented by P , A and C
respectively).
Now we define a game with two players and consider all payoffs that could result for one of the
players, in a conflict where each player takes one of the defined ego states.
Let pXX0i be the payoff value gained by player i when s/he plays with ego stateX and the other player
plays with ego state X 0, (X;X 0 2 fA;C; Pg). The payoff matrix is given in Figure 3.5.
In the full transactional model, each player has a choice of nine types of transactions correspond-
ing to the nine pairs of ego states the two players can adopt. In order to simplify the illustration
and explanation of this example, the parent ego state has been disregarded among the nine pairs of
transactions.
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Parent to Parent (PP ) Shall we stop mutual condemnation for a while?
Parent to Adult (PA) Let me tell you how bad mutual condemnation is.
Parent to Child (PC) Never condemn others.
Adult to Parent (AP ) What shall I do to stop mutual condemnation?
Adult to Adult (AA) Let’s stop mutual condemnation
Adult to Child (AC) You are condemning me.
Child to Parent (CP ) Please don’t condemn me.
Child to Adult (CA) Why do you condemn me?
Child to Child (CC) You condemn me so I condemn you.
Figure 3.4: Some examples of transactions.
Player 2
A C P
Player 1
A (pAA1 ; p
AA
2 ) (p
AC
1 ; p
AC
2 ) (p
AP
1 ; p
AP
2 )
C (pCA1 ; p
CA
2 ) (p
CC
1 ; p
CC
2 ) (p
CP
1 ; p
CP
2 )
P (pPA1 ; p
PA
2 ) (p
PC
1 ; p
PC
2 ) (p
PP
1 ; p
PP
2 )
Figure 3.5: Payoff matrix when players play with their particular ego states.
We assume that the strategy taken by each of the players comes from a pair of ego states; one belong-
ing to the player, and the other to the opponent. For instance, parents to parents PP ; means when
a player chooses this strategy, s/he uses her/his parent ego state and addresses it to the opponent’s
parent ego state. Similarly, for child to adult CA, a player chooses a child ego state and addresses it
to the opponent’s adult ego state.
It is assumed that the first game consisting of actions AA and CC is a Prisoner’s Dilemma, with AA
corresponding to “cooperation” and CC to “defection”. The consequence of this assumption in the
model is a symmetric series of payoff values for the payoff matrix. Figure 3.6 shows a self-evaluated
game in which strategies consist of four transactions belonging to the combinations of adult and child
ego states as well as their related summarized payoff values.
It is assumed that the values in each row and each column of the payoff matrix is either monotonically
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Player 2
AA AC CA CC
Player 1
AA (a; a) (f; e) (h; g) (c; b)
AC (e; f ) (l; l) (s; r) (u; t)
CA (g; h) (r; s) (v; v) (z; y)
CC (b; c) (t; u) (y; z) (d; d)
Figure 3.6: Payoff matrix due when the player strategy taken results from a pair of ego states.
increasing or monotonically decreasing as required by the conditions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
c < d < a < b c < h < f < a u < s < l < e z < v < r < g d < y < t < b
a < e < g < b f < l < r < t h < s < v < y c < u < z < d
Another step towards simplifying the problem at this stage is through a reduction of the variety of
payoff parameters. This is achieved by replacing some payoff parameters with a linear combination
of the others without losing their monotonic order. By applying the following assignments only four
parameters remain;
e = r = l =
(a+ b)
2
g = t = b f = a h =
(a+ c)
2
v = s =
(a+ d)
2
u =
(c+ d)
2
y =
(b+ d)
2
z = d
Therefore, the matrix payoff would resemble Figure 3.7.
Player 2
AA AC CA CC
Player 1
AA (a; a) (a; a+b
2
) (a+c
2
; b) (c; b)
AC (a+b
2
; a) (a+b
2
; a+b
2
) (a+d
2
; a+b
2
) ( c+d
2
; b)
CA (b; a+c
2
) (a+b
2
; a+d
2
) (a+d
2
; a+d
2
) (d; b+d
2
)
CC (b; c) (b; c+d
2
) ( b+d
2
; d) (d; d)
Figure 3.7: Payoff matrix of the basic game for the example of transactional analysis.
It is desirable to enrich the payoff model through the addition of another consideration regarding the
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source of payoff values after the two players have taken a strategy. So far it has been considered that
in essence only the players themselves can give payoff values to the result of strategies, taken by both
themselves and their opponents. The role of a ‘third party’ in this evaluation has been disregarded.
At this stage, it is intended to involve a third party’s role in the evaluation. The players’ values have
an effect on their decision making. Their values, beliefs and attitudes are developed throughout the
course of their lives, family and friends. Specifically social expectations and the experiences they
have had can all contribute to how they make a decision. Here, we introduce a game called society-
evaluated that represents social judgement or expectations.
In general, members of society are assumed to regard strategies taken from an adult oriented ego state
as being more constructive than from a child ego state. Under this assumption, we consider a moral
game, in which the highest moral payoff value is given for strategies with the most number of adult
ego state elements in a player’s strategy. Figure 3.8 accommodates these payoffs for the moral game
with m as a positive value. In assigning moral payoffs in conjunction with the properties of the first
matrix, it has been assumed that c < d < a < m < b.
Player 2
AA AC CA CC
Player 1
AA (m;m) (m
2
;m) ( m
2
;m) ( m;m)
AC (m; m
2
) (m
2
; m
2
) ( m
2
; m
2
) ( m; m
2
)
CA (m;  m
2
) (m
2
;  m
2
) ( m
2
;  m
2
) ( m;  m
2
)
CC (m; m) (m
2
; m) ( m
2
; m) ( m; m)
Figure 3.8: Payoff matrix of the moral game for the example of transactional analysis.
The last task is to combine the payoff values of the first game and the second game. This is an instance
of the double game in which each player is characterized by her/his type for each game. The payoff
values of the double game are given in Figure 3.9.
A player may choose to value social judgement over self evaluation; thus behaving in a way that will
encourage society to have admiration or approval for the player. However, a player may also decide
that her/his personal beliefs and values are more important than social expectations, resulting in the
player acting on personal expectations.
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Player 2
AA AC CA CC
Pl
ay
er
1
AA
 
(1  1)a+ 1m;
(1  2)a+ 2m

 
(1  1)a+ 1m
2
;
(1  2)a+ b
2
+ 2m

 
(1  1)a+ c
2
  1m
2
;
(1  2)b  2m

 
(1  1)c  1m;
(1  2)b+ 2m

AC
 
(1  1)a+ b
2
+ 1m;
(1  2)a+ 2m
2

 
(1  1)a+ b
2
+ 1
m
2
;
(1  2)a+ b
2
+ 2
m
2

 
(1  1)a+ d
2
  1m
2
;
(1  2)a+ b
2
+ 2
m
2

 
(1  1) c+ d
2
  1m;
(1  2)b+ 2m
2

AC
 
(1  1)b+ 1m;
(1  2)a+ c
2
  2m
2

 
(1  1)a+ b
2
+ 1
m
2
;
(1  2)a+ d
2
  2m
2

 
(1  1)a+ d
2
  1m
2
;
(1  2)a+ d
2
  2m
2

 
(1  1)d  1m;
(1  2) b+ d
2
  2m
2

CC
 
(1  1)b+ 1m;
(1  2)c  2m

 
(1  1)b+ 1m
2
;
(1  2) c+ d
2
  2m

 
(1  1) b+ d
2
  1m
2
;
(1  2)d  2m

 
(1  1)d  1m;
(1  2)d  2m

Figure 3.9: Payoff matrix of the double game for the example of transactional analysis.
If the values of types a, b, c, d and m were known, then Nash equilibrium would present the best
strategies for both players, for given values of 1 and 2. In other words, different types lead to
different Nash equilibria for the two players. Figure 3.10 shows the different regions of 1 and 2
where different pure Nash equilibria appear for assumed values a = 0, b =  1, c = 1, d =  1
2
and
m = 1
2
(shown in different colours).
2
1
(AA;CA)
(AA;AC)
(CA;CC), (CC;CA)
(CA;AA)
10
1
2
3
2
3
Figure 3.10: Variation of Nash equilibrium in the different regions of 1 and 2 for the example of transactional analysis.
Now, we present an example that uses gamification in a double game.
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Example 3.3. (Gamification)
Recent developments in e-commerce have focused on gamification and the impact this can have on
human’s behaviour. Gamification can be defined as the integration of motivational games or game-like
activities into the corporate domain. The effectiveness of the approach has been subject to extensive
debate amongst theorists and business owners. Gamification has been incorporated into various as-
pects of business structure, including HR, skills training, health and safety, customer engagement and
research and development [Wer14]. Gamification is used to manipulate end-user behaviour by pro-
viding them with extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Motivation that is prompted by a desire for tangible
rewards is defined as extrinsic whereas motivation that is prompted by an inherent passion or interest
is defined as intrinsic.
We can use the idea of multi-games in the gamified systems with two games, where one game is a
serious game and another game is an entertainment game [AD14]. Here we present a simple example
of the double game with gamification in the context of Group Project Assessment in which challenges,
points and levels can all create rewards which a player may or may not find appealing to strive towards.
In [Pit00] suggested the application of game theory into a common-practice method of assessment
within academic environments - group projects. In a typical group project, a team of two students or
more, are given a task to be carried out jointly. The task could be a range of group activities such
as carrying out experiments or making presentations. The arrangements of these groups could be
random, self selected or, more commonly, selected so that the groups are of equal ability and contain
a range of students with varying capability. Generally, the students can either be given the same mark,
or obtain marks based on their own relative contribution. These however introduce some problems
such as lack of cooperation, time wasting, and marking difficulties.
In a group with a bright student, it would seem logical that the highest achieving student did all or
most of the work. This way both the low achieving students in the group would get a good mark,
and the bright student would also ensure the work was not affected by the others. This discourages
cooperation and team work within students. To battle this, many academics introduce marks for either
teamwork or relative contribution. There are however few ways of knowing if the group worked as a
team. Asking them could lead to students pretending they worked as a team. Marks for relative effort
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may also result in players being shunned out of the group in order to maximise contribution or lying
about contribution, both of which go against the purpose of a group project.
In the serious game, we introduce a group project where groups of three students have to write a report
over six weeks on the assigned topic. Each group consists of a bright, average and poor student, who
are all trying to get the largest payoff possible (best grades). The final overall mark for the six week
project is given to each student as their final grade for the project.
We assume that if a bright student puts in a good effort, he will gain a marks for the overall project
and bmarks if he puts in a weak effort. For the average student, we assume a
2
and b
2
for good and weak
effort respectively. However, we assume in the case of the poor student that a good effort, meaning
he takes responsibility for a large part of the project, will negatively affect the quality of the work as
the others could have done it better, therefore resulting in  a
4
. However, if he puts in a weak effort, he
will not affect the quality of the work, contributing 0 marks to the project. In order to ensure that no
player scores a negative mark in the project, we assume a; b  0 and a  6b. Therefore, the matrix
payoff would resemble Figure 3.11. The Nash equilibrium for this game is achieved when both the
bright student and average student choose the good effort strategy and the poor student chooses the
weak effort strategy.
Average student
Good effort Weak effort Good effort Weak effort
B
ri
gh
ts
tu
de
nt
Good effort ( 5a
4
; 5a
4
; 5a
4
) ( 3a+2b
4
; 3a+2b
4
; 3a+2b
4
)
Good effort Poorstudent
Weak effort ( 4b+a
4
; 4b+a
4
; 4b+a
4
) ( 6b a
4
; 6b a
4
; 6b a
4
)
Good effort ( 6a
4
; 6a
4
; 6a
4
) ( 4a+2b
4
; 4a+2b
4
; 4a+2b
4
)
Weak effort
Weak effort ( 4b+2a
4
; 4b+2a
4
; 4b+2a
4
) ( 6b
4
; 6b
4
; 6b
4
)
Figure 3.11: Payoff matrix representation for serious game.
For our second game, we look to gamification. Challenges are the most integral feature of a gamified
group project as tasks are assigned to each player and rewards offered if they are successful. This
increases motivation as students perceive each challenge as a further step towards completion of the
task. Point systems are also important as points are awarded based on the quality of the completed
task. To ensure that a gamified group project is effective, it must offer rewards that appeal to the
students, as different players will be motivated by different factors. A gamified group project must
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also consider the social aspect of participation by providing leader-boards to monitor progress and
facilitate an increased level of commitment and competition. The success of each student depends on
the quality of her/his decisions. The majority of individuals require recognition or acknowledgement
for their achievements and they can achieve this by performing well or being committed in a series of
tasks. If their effort is recognised, their level of motivation will naturally increase.
Similar to Example 3.3 we can say that a gamified group project can be considered to be a double game
comprised of a group project task and a designed gamification. Similarly to how social judgement
and expectations influenced a player’s decisions in the moral judgement game, students will make
decisions based on how s/he regards the teacher’s approval. In this example, it is a sense of personal
achievement, teacher recognition, glory or self-satisfaction that can affect a player’s decision-making
approach.
For our entertainment game, we propose that the teacher takes a test every week for the six weeks of
the project on the topic of the project and records the hours each student attends after school sessions
to complete the group project. This data is then turned into a rank for a leader-board containing every
student in the group. The top half of the class are put in the ‘ positive’ category and the lower half in
the ‘negative’ category. This would act as motivation for the players to attend more sessions and work
on the project more in order to receive both recognition and praise as well as a sense of achievement
in beating others.
Here, we give values to the self-satisfaction given to students based on whether they fall in the positive
or negative category based on their rank which takes into account their test results and after class
attendance. It is assumed that if a player chooses the good effort strategy, s/he is guaranteed to be
in the positive category and if s/he chooses a weak strategy, s/he is guaranteed to be in the negative
category. For a bright student, if s/he falls in the positive category because s/he chose the good effort
strategy, s/he will have a m
2
payoff value when the poor student is also in that category, as s/he is
expecting themselves to do better and will not have a large payoff. If s/he falls into the negative
category by choosing the weak effort strategy s/he will have a  m payoff value because s/he will
be dissatisfied by the result when the poor student has done better, and s/he has performed below
expectations. The same applies to the average student in this case, with the same payoff values.
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Furthermore, for both the average and bright students, if they are the only student in their group with
the good effort strategy, their payoff will be m as they will have the satisfaction of being the only
student form the group in the positive category. For the poor student, her/his payoff will be m when
s/he has chosen the good effort strategy regardless of the other students and 0 if s/he has chosen the
weak effort strategy. Figure 3.12 accommodates these payoffs for the entertainment game with m as
a positive value.
Average student
Good effort Weak effort Good effort Weak effort
B
ri
gh
ts
tu
de
nt Good effort (
m
2
; m
2
;m) (m
2
; m;m)
Good effort Poorstudent
Weak effort ( m; m
2
;m) ( m; m;m)
Good effort (m;m; 0) (m;  m
2
; 0)
Weak effort
Weak effort ( m;m; 0) ( m;  m
2
; 0)
Figure 3.12: Payoff matrix representation for entertainment game.
Here, a player may choose to regard highly the sense of achievement, reward or competition that
comes with gamification, rather than not give much importance to them. If the rewarding aspects of
gamification offered in a game appeal to them, they may choose to pursue the task further than they
would if they did not care for the rewards or status. In the double game, a player may choose to
change her/his type so that s/he finds the competitiveness of a leader-board ranking effort to be an
exciting prospect, and therefore makes decisions to put in more effort than s/he initially had. A player
may also choose to regard the initial serious game more highly because of her/his personal interest in
the mark obtained for it. The payoff values of the double game are given in Figure 3.13 for assumed
values a = 4, b = 2 andm = 2.
Average student
Good Weak Good Weak
B
ri
gh
ts
tu
de
nt
Good (5  41; 5  42; 5  33) (4  31; 4  62; 4  23) Good Poorstudent
Weak (3  51; 3  22; 3  3) (2  41; 2  22; 2)
Good (6  41; 6  41; 6  63) (5  31; 5  62; 5  53) Weak
Weak (4  61; 4  22; 4  43) (3  51; 3  42; 3  33)
Figure 3.13: Payoff matrix representation for the double game in the gamification example where a = 4, b = 2 andm = 2.
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Different types lead to different Nash equilibria for the two players. Figure 3.14 shows the pure Nash
equilibria for the gamification example where types 1, 2 and 3 have values of 0; 1; and 12 . On the
figure, the Nash equilibria for different values of 1, 2 and 3 are shown. For example, a value of 1
for 1, 12 for 2 and 0 for 3 correspond to GGW . This means that players one and two should have a
good effort strategy and player three should have a weak effort strategy.
GGG
GGG
GGG
GGG
GGG
GGG
GGW
GGW
GGW
GG
G
GG
G
GG
W
GG
G
GG
G
GG
W
GG
G
GG
G
GG
W
GG
G
GG
G
GG
G
GG
G
GG
G
GG
G
GG
G
GG
G
GG
G
3 = 1
3 =
1
2
3 = 0
2 = 0
2 =
1
2
2 = 1 1 = 1
1 =
1
2
1 = 0
2
3
1
Figure 3.14: The pure regular strategies for the types with assumed values for Example 3.3.
Now if the types are all private information and can each take only a finite number of values between
0 and 1, then the double game is reduced to a Bayesian game with a finite set of types for the three
players and we can look for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 4
Double Games with N Players
In this chapter, we introduce the N-player double game, in which each player has the
same set of strategies in two basic games. We later define the class of pure regular double
game in which for pairs of extreme types there are 2N pure Nash equilibrium in which
the strategy of each player only depends on its own type. Similarly, we define the notion
of a completely pure regular double game where there are pure Nash equilibrium for all
possible pairs of types for the N players, and in which the strategy of each player only
depends on its own type. We then derive a test for establishing that a double game is
completely pure regular with computational complexity independent of the number of
types and actions. We also show that a pure Bayesian equilibrium for a completely pure
regular double game can be obtained directly from this test, thus reducing the complexity
of the computation.
We suppose that the multi-game is uniform with M = 2. We now have two basic games G1 and G2
and N players. For finite sets of types, we assume that the weights ij for each player i 2 I and each
game j 2 J are selected from finite discrete sets I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng and J = f1; 2g, which would
denote the types of each player i for a given game j. As M = 2, we can use only i instead of ij
(11 = 1; 12 = 1  1; 21 = 2 and 22 = 1  2). When these values represent private information,
we have a Bayesian game.
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4.1 Coherent Pairs of Nash Equilibrium
In the finite discrete case, the finite set of types for each player is given by a set of increasing values,
say ki (1  k  `i) where `i is the number of types for player i 2 I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng, and each
type is restricted to its unit interval. We assume that in the discrete case, we always have 0 and 1 as
types for each player, i.e., 1i = 0 and 
`i
i = 1, which we call the extreme types. We put 
 
i := 0 and
+i := 1. Let G(1;:::;N ) denote double game G with the types taking the specific values 1; : : : ; N . In
addition, in the discrete case, we let Gk1k2kN denote double game G with the types k11 ; k22 ; : : : ; kNN
selected for the N players respectively. We refer to a Nash equilibrium for G(1;:::;N ) as a local Nash
equilibrium for double game G. In the continuous case, let G12N denote double game G with the
types 1; 2; : : : ; N selected for the N players respectively.
Assume that there is a uniform N-player double game G with basic games G1 and G2. Given a player
i 2 I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng, we denote as usual the strategy set of the opponent of i by S i. Also we let
 = f(1; : : : ; N)ji 2 ig, where i is the set of types of player i. Given a player i, we denote the
set of types for players other than player i by  i. Given players i and m where m 6= i and m 2 I ,
let e (i;m) be the set of extreme types for players other than player i and playerm.
Definition 4.1. A double game G has a coherent set of pure Nash equilibria with a player i 2
I = f1; : : : ; Ng having a given type i = i if there is an action s 2 Si for which there ex-
ist sepp 2 Sp; for all p 6= i; p 2 I and all ep 2 f+; g such that the 2N 1 strategy profiles
(se11 ; : : : ; s
ei 1
i 1 ; s; s
ei+1
i+1 ; : : : ; s
eN
N ), are pure Nash equilibria for G with type i = i for player i and
with extreme types (e11 ; : : : ; 
ei 1
i 1 ; 
ei+1
i+1 ; : : : ; 
eN
N ) 2  i for the other players.
Assume that double game G has a coherent set of pure Nash equilibria (se11 ; : : : ; sei 1i 1 ; s; sei+1i+1 ; : : : ; seNN )
with a player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng having a given type i = i where s 2 Si and sepp 2 Sp, p 6= i; p 2 I
and ep 2 f+; g. We take any m 2 f m; +mg, where m 6= i;m 2 I and fix the extreme types
of the other players. The pair of profiles (se11 ; : : : ; s
ei 1
i 1 ; s; s
ei+1
i+1 ; : : : ; s
em 1
m 1 ; s
 
m; s
em+1
m+1 ; : : : ; s
eN
N ); (s
e1
1 ;
: : : ; s
ei 1
i 1 ; s; s
ei+1
i+1 ; : : : ; s
em 1
m 1 ; s
+
m; s
em+1
m+1 ; : : : ; s
eN
N ) where s
 
m; s
+
m 2 Sm, is called the coherent pair of
pure Nash equilibrium for game G with player i having a given type i = i and playerm having type
m.
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For example, consider a double game G with three players. Assume that there are actions s1 2 S1 and
s 2 ; s
+
2 2 S2 and s 3 2 S3. Suppose G has a coherent pair of Nash equilibria
 
(s1; s
 
2 ; s
 
3 ); (s1; s
+
2 ; s
 
3 )

when we fix the extreme type  3 for player 3 and we fix type 1 = 

1 for player 1. Figure 4.1 shows
the coherent pair of Nash equilibria
 
(s1; s
 
2 ; s
 
3 ); (s1; s
+
2 ; s
 
3 )

for G.
2
3
1
1 = 

1
(s1; s
+
2 ; s
 
3 )
(s1; s
 
2 ; s
 
3 )
Figure 4.1: Illustration of a coherent pair in a double game with three players.
The following example shows a double game G which has a coherent pair  (z; v); (z; w) of pure
Nash equilibrium, with the first player having a given type 1. This example shows that if one player
has more than two actions, then for the different parameter value of 2, we may not have a pure Nash
equilibrium. Alternatively we may have a pure Nash equilibrium which, in the first player’s action, is
not equal to the first action of the coherent pair of pure Nash equilibrium for G where the first player
has a given type 1. Therefore, when considering the double game, we restrict ourselves to having
only two actions for each player.
Example 4.1. Consider a double game G. We present an example for the case that each player has a
strategy set: S1 = fz; ug and S2 = fv; w; yg, with the payoff matrices of two basic games given in
Figure 4.2. The pair of profiles
 
(z; v); (z; y)

is a coherent pair of pure Nash equilibrium for G with
player 1 having type 1 = 0 and player 2 having extreme types 2 = 0 and 2 = 1.
Player 2
v w y
Player 1
z (3; 2) (2; 2) (2; 1)
u (2; 1) (3; 2) (1; 3)
(a) Game 1
Player 2
v w y
Player 1
z (3; 1) (2; 2) (2; 3)
u (2; 6) (3; 4) (1; 1)
(b) Game 2
Figure 4.2: Payoff matrices representation for Example 4.1 (1).
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The payoff matrix of double game G for 1 = 0 and 2 = 14 is given in Figure 4.3 and strategy profile
(u;w) is a pure Nash equilibrium that is not coherent with strategy profiles (z; v) and (z; y).
Player 2
v w y
Player 1
z (3; 7
4
) (2; 8
4
) (2; 6
4
)
u (2; 9
4
) (3; 10
4
) (1; 10
4
)
Figure 4.3: Payoff matrix of the double game in Example 4.1 (1).
Now we assume the payoff matrices of two basic games are given in Figure 4.4. Strategy profiles
(z; v) and (z; y) are a coherent pair, with player 1 having type 1 = 0 and player 2 having extreme
types 2 = 0 and 2 = 1.
Player 2
v w y
Player 1
z (3; 2) (2; 2) (2; 1)
u (2; 1) (3; 1) (1; 3)
(a) Game 1
Player 2
v w y
Player 1
z (3; 1) (2; 2) (2; 3)
u (2; 6) (3; 4) (1; 1)
(b) Game 2
Figure 4.4: Payoff matrices representation for Example 4.1 (2).
The payoff matrix of G for 1 = 0 and 2 = 14 is given in Figure 4.5 and G fails to have the pure Nash
equilibrium.
Player 2
v w y
Player 1
z (3; 7
4
) (2; 8
4
) (2; 6
4
)
u (2; 9
4
) (3; 7
4
) (1; 10
4
)
Figure 4.5: Payoff matrix of the double game in Example 4.1 (2).
Therefore, for the purpose of this research, we restrict ourselves to having only two actions for each
player in the case of a double game.
The following lemma and proof are by Abbas Edalat.
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Lemma 4.1. If the double game with two players has a coherent pair
 
(z; v); (z; w)

of pure Nash
equilibrium with the first player having type 1 = 1, then there exists an integer S with 1  S  `2
such that Gk1k2 has (z; v) as a pure Nash equilibrium for 1  k2 < S and has (z; w) as a pure Nash
equilibrium for S < k2  `2.
Proof. Consider a double game G. Each player has a strategy set with two actions: S1 = fz; ug and
S2 = fv; wg, with the payoff matrices of two basic games given in Figure 4.6.
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (a1; a2) (b1; b2)
u (c1; c2) (d1; d2)
(a) Game 1
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (e1; e2) (f1; f2)
u (g1; g2) (h1; h2)
(b) Game 2
Figure 4.6: Payoff matrix representation for Lemma 4.1.
The payoff matrix for G is given in Figure 4.7.
v w
z (1  1)a1 + 1e1, (1  2)a2 + 2e2 (1  1)b1 + 1f1, (1  2)b2 + 2f2
u (1  1)c1 + 1g1, (1  2)c2 + 2g2 (1  1)d1 + 1h1, (1  2)d2 + 2h2
Figure 4.7: Payoff matrix representation of the double game for Lemma 4.1.
Suppose that for 2 = 0 and 2 = 1 and for a given 1 = 1 we obtain the pair of coherent Nash
equilibria (z; v) and (z; w) thus;
(
u2(z; v; 

1; 0)  u2(z; w; 1; 0); (4.1)
u2(z; w; 

1; 1)  u2(z; v; 1; 1): (4.2)
Using Figure 4.7 and Equations 4.1 and 4.2, we have
(
(1  2)a2 + 2e2  (1  2)b2 + 2f2; (4.3)
(1  2)b2 + 2f2  (1  2)a2 + 2e2: (4.4)
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By rearranging the above inequalities, we can see
(
2(b2 + e2   a2   f2) + a2   b2  0;
2(b2 + e2   a2   f2) + a2   b2  0:
We let
L2 = 2(b2 + e2   a2   f2) + a2   b2:
The line L2 as a linear function of 2 divides the space of pure Nash equilibrium for G with player i
having a given type 1 = 1 into two regions. One region of pure Nash equilibrium (z; v) and another
region of pure Nash equilibrium (z; w) which satisfy Inequalities 4.3 and 4.4. Figure 4.8 shows the
line L2 .
2
payoff
L2
10
b2   a2
f2   e2
(z; w)(z; v)
Figure 4.8: Division of the space of pure Nash equilibrium for type 1 into two regions by the line L2 as a linear function of 2.
Hence there exists an integer S with 1  S  `2 such that Gk1k2 has (z; v) as a pure Nash equilibrium
for 1  k2 < S and has (z; w) as a pure Nash equilibrium for S < k2  `2.
We call S given in Lemma 4.1, the type changing point.
The following example shows a double game with two players, such that the first basic game fails to
have a pure Nash equilibrium and the second basic game has two pure Nash equilibria.
Example 4.2. In this example, each player has a strategy set with two actions: S1 = fz; ug and
S2 = fv; wg, with the payoff matrices of two basic games given in Figure 4.9. The first basic game
is similar to a Matching Pennies game that has no pure Nash equilibrium but it has a unique mixed
Nash equilibrium.
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Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (1; 0) (0; 1)
u (0; 1) (1; 0)
(a) Game 1
Player 2
v w
Player 1
z (3; 1) (3; 0:5)
u (3; 0:5) (3; 1)
(b) Game 2
Figure 4.9: Payoff matrices representation for Example 4.2.
v w
z (1  1) + 31, 0 + 2 0 + 31, (1  2) + 0:52
u 0 + 31, (1  2) + 0:52 (1  1) + 31, 0 + 2
Figure 4.10: Payoff matrix representation of the double game in Example 4.2.
The payoff matrix of double game G is given in Figure 4.10.
We observe there are pure Nash equilibria for certain values of 1 and 2 for G. For example, the
profile (z; v) is a pure Nash equilibrium if 1  1 and 2  23 . Figure 4.11 shows the different regions
of 1 and 2 where different pure Nash equilibria appear. Uncoloured zones represent the regions
where there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
2
1
10
1
2
3
(z; v); (u;w)
(z; w); (u; v)
No pure Nash equilibrium
Figure 4.11: Illustration of Nash equilibrium in the different regions of 1 and 2 for Example 4.2.
Next, we examine how information about the set of local pure Nash equilibrium for a double game
with various types of N players, can be used to deduce the Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the double
game.
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4.2 Pure Regular Double Game
We consider a double game to be pure regular if it has a set of 2N pairs of pure Nash equilibrium for
all extreme types, for which the strategy of each player only depends on its own type. Here is the
exact definition.
Definition 4.2. A double game with a finite set of types for each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng, is pure
regular if there are actions si 2 Si for i 2 I such that the strategy profiles (s1; : : : ; si; : : : ; sN) are
pure Nash equilibria for the double game with player i having extreme types eii ; ei 2 f ;+g.
Figure 4.12 shows pure regularity in a double game G with three players while each player has a
strategy set: S1 = fv; xg, S2 = fz; wg and S3 = fu; yg. Here, there are eight pure strategy
profiles (v; u; z); (v; u; w); (v; y; z); (v; y; w); (x; u; z); (x; u; w); (x; y; z); (x; y; w) for G with each
player utilising its extreme types.
2
3
1
(x,y,w)
(v,y,w)
(x,y,z)
(v,y,z)
(x,u,w)
(v,u,w)
(x,u,z)
(v,u,z)
Figure 4.12: Illustration of eight pure regular Nash equilibria in a double game with three players.
For a double game with a finite set of types for each player, we can go further, as follows.
4.3 Complete Pure Regular Double Game
Definition 4.3. We say a double game with a finite set of types for each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng
given by ki (1  k  `i) is completely pure regular if there are pure strategies sk 2 Si for (1 
k  `i) such that the strategy profiles (sk1 ; : : : ; ski ; : : : ; skN ) are pure Nash equilibria for the game
Gk1kikN for (1  ki  `i).
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It is clear that a completely pure regular double game is pure regular and thus our terminology is
consistent. Let si(:) : i ! Si be a function that specifies a pure strategy si(i) for player i 2 I =
f1; : : : ; Ng wherei is set of types for player i and i 2 i. We will prove that for a completely pure
regular double game, the strategy profile
 
s1(:); s2(:); : : : ; sN(:)

is a pure Bayesian strategy profile,
in which each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng takes strategy si(:) where si(:) refers to the pure strategy of
player i corresponding to a type from i.
Theorem 4.1. If the double game is completely pure regular, then for all prior distributions p, such
that p(i) > 0 for all i 2 i; 8i 2 I for the N players’ types, the Bayesian pure strategy profile 
s1(:); s2(:); : : : ; sN(:)

is a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since the finite types i for each player i are considered to be private information and can each
take only a finite number of values between 0 and 1, the double game is reduced to a Bayesian game
with a finite set of types for the N players. Let the double game G be a Bayesian game with a finite
number of types for each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng, and si(:) : i ! Si. Based on the assumption
that G is completely pure regular, thus;
si(i) 2 argmaxs0i2Si ui
 
s0i; s i( i); (i;  i)

(4.5)
for all s0i 2 Si. Since
P
 i p( iji) = 1, we can rewrite 4.5 as follows;
si(i) 2 argmaxs0i2Si ui
 
s0i; s i( i); (i;  i)

:
X
 i
p( iji): (4.6)
We know that utility ui
 
s0i; s i( i); (i;  i)

in a multi-game is independent of  i, therefore, we
have;
si(i) 2 argmaxs0i2Si
X
 i
p( iji)ui
 
s0i; s i( i); (i;  i)

: (4.7)
for all s0i 2 Si. Recall Definition 2.12, the strategy profile si(:) in 4.7 is a pure Bayesian equilibrium
for game G for all i 2 I and all i 2 i such that p(i) > 0. Therefore, the Bayesian pure strategy
profile
 
s1(:); : : : ; si(:); : : : ; sN(:)

is a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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4.4 Separatrix Hyperplane
In an N-player double game, we introduce a function pim : e (i;m)  i 7 ! m where i;m 2 I =
f1; 2; : : : ; Ng and i 6= m. This function has two arguments. The first one is the set of extreme types
for players other than player i and player m and all of their types are fixed at their extreme types,
while the second argument is the set of types for player i. The function pim returns the type changing
point for playerm given in Lemma 4.1.
If pim does not depend on either of its two arguments, then there is a separatrix hyperplane m = Sm
such that m = Sm is always independent of i 2 i and  2 e (i;m). The hyperplane m = Sm is
called a constant type changing hyperplane. The point of intersection of the constant type changing
hyperplanes is called the partition point P 2 Q = [0; 1]N . Figure 4.13 shows constant type changing
hyperplanes and some partition points in a 3-player double game G while each player has a strategy
set with two actions: fu; vg.
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Figure 4.13: Illustration of the type changing hyperplanes and partition points in a 3-player double game.
Theorem 4.2. An N-player double game is completely pure regular if and only if for all types ki
(1  k  `i) for each player i 2 I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng, the value of the type changing point pim of each
playerm 2 I ,m 6= i, is constant.
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Proof. ()) Now we assume that the double game is completely pure regular. Fix m 2 I =
f1; 2; : : : ; Ng; take any extreme types of m, m 2 f m; +mg. Also for any player i 2 I , where
i 6= m, we take i 2 f i ; +i g. Let si(:) : i ! Si where i is a set of types for player i and i 2 i
such that
 
s1(1); : : : ; sN(N)

is a pure Nash equilibrium. Recall Section 4.4 that e (i;m) is a set
of extreme types for players other than player i and player m and all of their types are fixed at the
their extreme types. As the double game is completely pure regular, pim : e (i;m)  i 7 ! m is
constant, otherwise sm(m) depends on i or e (i;m), which contradicts the complete pure regularity
for the double game. Therefore, the value of type changing point pim for each player m, is constant
for all types ki (1  k  `i) of each player i. 8m 8i 6= m
pim
 
 (i;m); i

= Sm
( ) Now we assume that 8m 8i 6= m; pim
 
 (i;m); i

= Sm. Thus pim is constant and the strategies
of each player m 2 I only depends on its own type; therefore, the double game is completely pure
regular.
Corollary 4.1. The double game is completely pure regular if and only if there is a partition point
P 2 Q = [0; 1]N such that the sub-hypercubes generated by P using hyperplanes through P parallel
to the coordinate planes partition Q into regions of constant Nash equilibrium.
In a double game, the constant type changing hyperplanes partition the space of pure Nash equilibrium
into several blocks of pure Nash equilibrium for each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng for the given type
i. We let qi denote the number of blocks containing constant Nash equilibrium for player i for each
i. For each player i, as we restrict ourselves to a uniform double game with only two actions for
each player then we have qi  2, thus
QN
i=1 qi  2N . Figure 4.14 shows an example of the number of
blocks containing constant Nash equilibrium in a double game G with two players.
In an N -player double game, for each player i 2 I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng, there exists two N-1 player
games at the extreme types  i and 
+
i that are called opposite faces for player i.
Corollary 4.2. A 2-player double game is completely pure regular if and only if the partition point of
each face is the same as the partition point of its opposite face.
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0
1
2
10 1
Constant type
changing hyperplane
q2 = 1
q1 = 2
Figure 4.14: An example of the number of blocks containing constant Nash equilibrium in a double game G with two players.
If the partition points at two opposite faces are the same, we call them matched partition points.
Theorem 4.3. In any N -player double game with finite sets of types, if all 2- player sub-games are
completely pure regular then any k-dimensional sub-game, (2  k  N ) is completely pure regular.
Proof. Assume all 2-player sub-games are completely pure regular. Consider a k-dimensional sub-
game with k players. Let B  I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng; jBj = k. Take m 2 B; take any extreme type
of m, m 2 f m; +mg. Also for any player i 2 B, where i 6= m, we take i 2 f i ; +i g. Recall
Section 4.4 that e (i;m) is the set of extreme types of players other than player i and playerm. Using
Corollary 4.2, there are matched partition points for each 2-player game. Thus have 8m 8i 6= m 8x 2
e (i;m)
pim(x; 
+
i ) = pim(x; 
 
i ) = 
S
m: (4.8)
Let A  I = f1; : : : ; Ng. Let e A be the set of extreme types of players other than subset A,
If  2 e A then jj = N   jAj:
Let
t : 
e
 A := ft :  j  2 e Ag
where t :  is the concatenation of t and the list . Then
if  2 t : e A then jj = N   jAj+ 1:
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Since  t : e (i;m;t)  e (i;m) and +t : e (i;m;t)  e (i;m), and by Equation 4.8, then
8m; i; t 2 B ; t 6= i 6= m; ; t 6= m;8y 2 +t : e (i;m;t) ;8z 2  t : e (i;m;t);
pim(y; 
+
i ) = pim(z; 
+
i ) = 
S
m;
pim(y; 
 
i ) = pim(z; 
 
i ) = 
S
m;
which shows in each k- dimensional sub-game, the value of the type changing point of each player is
constant. Therefore, any k dimensional sub-game, (2  k  N ) is completely pure regular.
Consider a completely pure regular double game G with three players, where each player has a strategy
set with two actions: fs; ug. Figure 4.15 (a) shows the completely pure regular 2-player sub-game
and matched partition points where
p23(
+
1 ; 
+
2 ) = p23(
+
1 ; 
 
2 ) = 
S
3
Therefore, type changing point p23(+1 ; 
+
2 ) is matched with type changing point p23(
 
1 ; 
+
2 )
 
Figure-
4.15 (b)

and also type changing point p23( 1 ; 
+
2 ) is matched with type changing point p23(
 
1 ; 
 
2 ) 
Figure 4.15 (c)

. Figure 4.15 (d) shows that the partition point of a 2-player sub-game matches with
the partition point of its opposite 2-player. Similarly, we can prove that the value of the type changing
point of each player is constant. Therefore, 3 dimensional sub-game is completely pure regular.
Corollary 4.3. An N-player double game is completely pure regular, if and only if, for each player
i 2 I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng, the two N-1 player games at the extreme types  i and +i are completely pure
regular with the matched partition points.
Figure 4.16 (a) represents a double game G with three players while each player has a strategy set
with two actions: fu; vg. The double game is completely pure regular and constant type changing
hyperplanes partition the space of pure Nash equilibrium into 8 blocks of pure Nash equilibrium with
constant pure Nash equilibrium in each. Figure 4.16 (b) represents an example of a double game G
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Figure 4.15: The opposite faces and matched partition points in a 3-player double game.
with two unmatched partition points on the two opposite faces in a double game G for three players.
Now we present an efficient algorithm for the double game in order to establish whether we have
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that can be determined with lower computational complexity. We can
determine if a double game with finite types for the N players is completely pure regular by using
Algorithm 1. The basic idea is a recursive check to see if the opposite faces for each player i 2
I = f1; : : : ; Ng are pure regular and if the partition point of each face are matched with the partition
points of its opposite face. At the lowest recursion level, we have a double game with two players and
we test whether the double game is pure regular and if the partition points of each face are matched
with the partition point of its opposite face. Thus, we can only check each 2-player game.
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Figure 4.16: Illustration of the blocks of pure Nash equilibrium with constant pure Nash equilibrium (a) and the unmatched partition points (b), in a
double game G for three players.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm to test for the property of being complete pure regular in GN with N players
Input: An N-player double game GN .
Output: GN is completely pure regular or not.
1 CPR(G): G is completely pure regular.
2 PR(G): The opposite faces for players are pure regular in G.
3 M(G): In G, the partition point of each face matches with the partition
point of its opposite face.
4 begin
5 G := GN
6 if CPR(G) = PR(G) ^M(G).
7 PR(G) = V t2[G]
e2f+; g
PR(Get t): Check recursively
8 M(G) = V t2[G]
e2f+; g
M(Get t): Check recursively
9 then
10 GN is Completely Pure Regular
11 else
12 GN is not Completely Pure Regular
13 end
Corollary 4.4. Given any double game with a finite number of types for N players, we can decide if
it is completely pure regular, in which case a Bayesian pure Nash equilibrium is obtained O
 
2N

.
Proof. The number of k-dimensional hypercubes on the boundary of an N -cube is 2N k
 
N
k

. In
the double game, for a 2-player game, we have k = 2 and so the number of 2-player games is
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1
2!
:N(N   1)2N 2. Thus, for Algorithm 1, the computational complexity is O 2N.
Therefore, for the class of completely pure regular double games, the Nash equilibria of the basic
games can be used to compute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the double game with respect to the
number of players.
Chapter 5
An Application: A Double Game for
Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this chapter, we explain a double game extension of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to model
pro-social behaviour. In this double game for Prisoner’s dilemma, the first game is the
classical Prisoner’s dilemma and the second game captures the social or moral gain for
cooperation for each player. We furthermore consider the double game for the Prisoner’s
dilemma where the social (altruistic) coefficient of each player forms a finite discrete set
of incomplete information or types, thus giving rise to a Bayesian game. We prove that
this double game is in fact pure regular and determine its Bayesian equilibrium when it is
completely pure regular.
Game theory has been an important tool for addressing problems regarding the origins of conventions,
fairness, and pro-social behaviour in general. In an overwhelming number of situations, people do not
seem to behave in their self-interest, but rather behave pro-socially, contrary to what classical game
theory suggests (that people always act in their own self-interest).
We now review the concept of pro-social behaviour and moral gain in Prisoner’s Dilemma. Recall
Section 2.6, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is considered a standard method for modelling social dilemmas
and has also been used to model conditional altruistic cooperation, which has also been tested by
real monetary payoffs. However, when confronted with the choice to cooperate or defect, human
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beings not only consider their material score, but also the social and moral payoffs of any decision
they make. This means that the material payoffs presented in the Prisoner’s Dilemma cannot provide
a complete picture of the decision making process human beings follow. In fact, according to some
researchers, human social evolution has a moral direction which has extended our moral campus
in the course of thousands of years of increasing communication and complexity in human social
organisation [Wri01, Wri10]. Moreover, there are individual and temporal variations in pro-social
attitudes of human beings with some making decisions more based on self-interest than others. A
more adequate model of human behaviour should take into account these aspects of social evolution
as well. The same applies to economic decisions by corporations or governments, in which actions
taken can have significant social and environmental implications, which are not incorporated in the
material gains they produce. In [She94], it was proposed that a coefficient of morality be introduced
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the payoff values of the players be accordingly changed. The so-called
altruistic extension of any finite strategic game was defined in [CKKS11], which endows each player
with an altruistic level in the unit interval which provides the weight of the pro-social attitude of the
player. This modification aims to reflect real-life situations and dilemmas more accurately by taking
into account both material and moral/social gains. Thus, for each player, the payoff is a weighted,
linear combination of the payoffs for the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the social game. In essence, it is a
convex combination of the payoffs occurring from both material and social dilemmas.
We show that the double game, as an instance of multi-games, provides a generalisation of the altru-
istic extension in [CKKS11] which can be considered as a double game with the first game identified
as the original game and the second game as a symmetric altruistic game. In a general double game,
the social or altruistic game is allowed to be non-symmetric, which means that in general the altruistic
payoffs for the different players may be different even for the same strategy profile.
5.1 The Social Game
The social game encourages cooperation and discourages defection, as cooperating is usually con-
sidered to be the ethical and moral choice to make when interacting with others in social dilemmas.
This can be done in different ways corresponding to different types of payoff matrices. Here, we will
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restrict to the case that the social game encourages cooperation and discourages defection for each
player, independently of the action chosen by the other player.
We present the normal form and the mathematical formulation of the social game as follows. Assume
that the competing participants in the social game are player 1 and player 2. Each of them has the
choice to select between “C” and “D ”. When they have both made their choice, the payoffs assigned
to them are calculated according to Figure 5.1, whereM1,M2 andM
0
1,M
0
2 satisfy:
M1 > M
0
1, M2 > M
0
2:
When M1 = M2 and M 01 = M
0
2, we will have a symmetric social game and our framework reduces
to the altruistic extension in [CKKS11].
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C (M1;M2) (M1;M
0
2)
D (M 01;M2) (M
0
1;M
0
2)
Figure 5.1: Payoff matrix representation of Social game.
Thus, in the social game we treat in this chapter, the players are individually and independently
rewarded for cooperating and punished for defecting. This can be interpreted in the following way.
Cooperation by an individual, independent of the action of the opponent, is socially rewarded by
inducing a good conscience, whereas defection is punished by creating a guilty one. The values
of M1, M2 and M
0
1, M
0
2 are assumed to be socially determined to correspond to the average moral
norm in the given society and are considered to have evolved in the course of increasing complexity,
communication and moral growth in human history.
5.2 The Double Game Extension of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Although the payoffs for the social game are determined by the social context of the game, there is
still individual variation in pro-social behaviour of the players. We assume each player has a social
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coefficient taking values between 0 and 1, which reflects how pro-social they are in practice in each
round of the game. In our particular social game, the social coefficient of a player signifies how
much the player cares about the morality or the social aspect of their action. The payoffs of the
double game for each player are then the weighted sum or convex combination of the payoffs of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Figure 2.8) and social game (Figure 5.1) using the player’s social coefficient as
represented in Figure 5.2, where 1 and 2 (with 0  1; 2  1) are the social coefficients of players
1 and 2, respectively. Note that the two players can still play the standard version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma by selecting their social coefficients to be equal to 0, in which case the double game reduces
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
C D
C (1 - 1)R + 1M1, (1 - 2)R + 2M2 (1 - 1)S + 1M1, (1 - 2)T + 2S
D (1 - 1)T + 1S, (1 - 2)S + 2M2 (1 - 1)P + 1S, (1 - 2)P + 2S
Figure 5.2: Payoff matrix representation of the double game in Prisoner’s Dilemma example.
In addition to the inequalities satisfied in the payoffs for Prisoner’s Dilemma and social game, we stip-
ulate the two new inequalities below that connect the payoff values from both the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the social game:
8<:M1; M2 >
(R + P )
2
;
T > R > M1 M2 > P > S or T > R > M2 M1 > P > S:
First, we argue that M1 and M2 should be less than T , but greater than P . The former should hold,
otherwise ifM1 andM2 are equal to or greater than T , then, there is no dilemma as to what the best
strategy is (one should select the highest possible social coefficient and always choose “C ” in order
to achieve the highest available payoff), and the social game loses its meaning. On the other hand, the
latter should hold, because, ifM1 andM2 are equal to or less than P , then, cooperation is discouraged,
since one would have no incentive to select a high social coefficient and choose “C ”. In addition,M1
andM2 should be strictly less than R, as we would like to encourage cooperation in the social game
by assigning it a payoff value that is somewhat less than the payoff value obtained through mutual
cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This, we believe, reflects more accurately real-life situations,
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as, in general, the decisions based on moral incentives do not bring high material benefits. Finally,
we assume that M1 and M2 should be greater than the average of R and P , so that the dilemma of
whether to cooperate or defect becomes more intense.
Then, we argue thatM 01 andM
0
2 should be equal to S, so as to discourage defection with a high social
coefficient, which would be self-contradictory, and, to punish, in a sense, defection, sinceM 01 andM
0
2
are the payoff values for defection in the social game, which, by its definition, should not give a high
value to defection.
The selection of the social coefficient reveals, in part, the strategy that one will follow in a given
game. To illustrate this with an example, note that the choice of social coefficient equal to 1 implies
cooperation, since defection would give a payoff of 0, and, similarly, the choice of social coefficient
equal to 0 most probably implies defection, since cooperation in that case would give a payoff of
0, unless it is mutual, in which case it would be beneficial. On the other hand, selecting a social
coefficient between 0 and 1 leaves room for more complex and sophisticated strategies. Finally, as
we will see later on in Chapter 8, in the implementation of the double game, certain restrictions are
imposed on how much a player can increase or decrease the social coefficient in a single round. This
is done, since, in general, humans do not change their moral values radically in a short amount of
time.
5.3 Double Game with Complete Information
If we assume that the players know each other’s social coefficients prior to every game, the double
game becomes a game with complete information and all payoffs are known to both players. In this
section we focus on the analysis of Nash equilibrium in this type of double game. It is well known
that the Nash equilibrium for the Prisoner’s Dilemma is mutual defection, represented by (D;D).
However, from the perspective of the social game, the best response of any player is to cooperate, as
this always leads to a better score as compared to defecting. As a result, if the players make their
decisions with no concern for their opponents’ behaviour, it leads to a Nash equilibrium of mutual
cooperation, represented by (C;C). However, this simplicity cannot be incorporated in the double
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game, due to the inclusion of the social coefficient, which alters the reward for all outcomes.
In accordance with the equilibrium, we must find out how the social coefficients of the two players
alter the potential payoffs for four possible outcomes of the game. The payoffs for each possible
outcome change along with the variation in the social coefficients 1 and 2 of players 1 and 2,
respectively, as shown in Figure 5.7. At this stage, we consider the payoff equations for player 1. We
note that, by symmetry, a similar analysis can be conducted for player 2. Furthermore, without loss
of generality, we assume the equalityM 01 = M
0
2 = S, since the social game punishes defection.
For 1 let us label the three crossing points of the payoff equations as 1 = a1 for u1(D;D) =
u1(C;D), 1 = b1 for u1(D;C) = u1(C;C) and 1 = c1 for u1(D;C) = u1(C;D). By equating the
equations for each payoff, we find the values of the crossing points (similarly for 2) to be:
a1 =
P   S
M1 + P   2S ; a2 =
P   S
M2 + P   2S ;
b1 =
T  R
T   S +M1  R; b2 =
T  R
T   S +M2  R;
c1 =
T   S
M1 + T   2S ; c2 =
T   S
M2 + T   2S :
We have the three following cases:
8>>><>>>:
a1 < b1 < c1; a2 < b2 < c2 if P   S < T  R;
b1 < a1 < c1; b2 < a2 < c2 if P   S > T  R;
a1 = b1 < c1; a2 = b2 < c2 if P   S = T  R:
We can obtain the Nash equilibrium points for M1;M2 > R and M1;M2 < R and M1 = M2 = R;
note that for all values of 1 and 2 that are greater than b1 or b2, the equilibria are equal. To illustrate
the method, we will compute below the Nash equilibrium for the two generic cases of a1 < b1; a2 <
b2 and b1 < a1; b2 < a2 when T > R > M1 > M2 > P > M 01 = M
0
2 = S. We used ideas of
Ounsley [Oun10] to write the two next sections.
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5.3.1 Case: a1 < b1 and a2 < b2
Figure 5.3 shows the variation in the payoffs resulting from each outcome of the double game with
different values of 1. We can describe the order of preference for all values of 1 lying between 0 and
1 by using the values of a1, b1 and c1 and the functions shown in Figure 5.6, and then we can obtain
the equilibria for different social coefficients.
D;C
C;C
D;D
C;D
P
S
R
T
S
M1
T
0 b1a1 c1
a1 < b1 < c1
Figure 5.3: Change of payoffs T > R > M1 > M2 > P > M 01 = M
0
2 = S.
Figure 5.4 shows the preference ordering of player 1 for the variation of 1.
Type 1 Preference ordering of player 1
0  1 < a1 (D;C) > (C;C) > (D;D) > (C;D)
1 = a1 (D;D) = (C;D)
a1 < 1 < b1 (D;C) > (C;C) > (C;D) > (D;D)
1 = b1 (D;C) = (C;C)
b1 < 1 < c1 (C;C) > (D;C) > (C;D) > (D;D)
1 = c1 (D;C) = (C;D)
c1 < 1  1 (C;C) > (C;D) > (D;C) > (D;D)
Figure 5.4: Preference ordering of player 1 for the variation of 1.
Since the double game is a symmetric game, the same inequalities also exist for player 2, with the
social coefficient for player 2 being 2 instead of 1, and each outcome being replaced with its mirror
point. Figure 5.5 shows the preference ordering of player 1 for the variation of 2. For instance while
(D;C) is shown to be the most preferable for player 1 in Figure 5.3, (C;D) would take its place for
player 2. The pair (1; 2) is a point of unit square [0; 1] [0; 1].
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Type 2 Preference ordering of player 2
0  2 < a1 (C;D) > (C;C) > (D;D) > (D;C)
2 = a1 (D;D) = (D;C)
a1 < 2 < b1 (C;D) > (C;C) > (D;C) > (D;D)
2 = b1 (C;D) = (C;C)
b1 < 2 < c1 (C;C) > (C;D) > (D;C) > (D;D)
2 = c1 (C;D) = (D;C)
c1 < 2  1 (C;C) > (D;C) > (C;D) > (D;D)
Figure 5.5: Preference ordering of player 2 for the variation of 2.
The equilibria for different social coefficients in the case of a1 < b1 are given in Figure 5.6 for the
generic sub-rectangles.
a2
0
b2
1
0 a1 b1 1
(D;C)
(D;C)
(D;D)
(D;C)
(C;D), (D;C)
(C;D)
(C;C)
(C;D)
(C;D)
Figure 5.6: The set of Nash equilibria for each of the 9 generic regions (a1 < b1; a2 < b2).
The equilibria for different social coefficients in the case of a1 < b1 are given are presented in Fig-
ure 5.7, which includes the boundary points of these 9 regions. Note that on any boundary point of
2 or 4 generic regions, the set of equilibria is precisely the union of equilibria in the neighbouring
generic regions.
5.3.2 Case: b1 < a1 and b2 < a2
Figure 5.8 (a) illustrates the change in payoffs resulting from each outcome of the double game with
different values of 1 in the case of b1 < a1. Figure 5.8 (b) provides the set of equilibria for each of
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b2 < 2  1 (D;C) (D;C) (D;C) (C;C), (D;C) (C;C)
2 = b2 (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;C), (C;D), (D;C) (C;C), (C;D)
a2 < 2 < b2 (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D)
2 = a2 (D;D), (D;C) (D;D), (D;C), (C;D) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D)
0  2 < a2 (D;D) (D;D), (C;D) (C;D) (C;D) (C;D)
0  1 < a1 1 = a1 a1 < 1 < b1 1 = b1 b1 < 1  1
Figure 5.7: Nash equilibria for different social coefficients for a1 < b1 and a2 < b2.
the 9 generic regions.
D;C
C;C
D;D
C;DP
S
R
T
S
M1
T
0 a1b1 c1 1
b1 < a1 < c1
(a)
a2
0
b2
1
0 a1 b1 1
(D;C)
(D;D)
(D;D)
(C;C)
(C;C), (D;D)
(D;D)
(C;C)
(C;C)
(C;D)
(b)
Figure 5.8: (a) Change of payoffs (The variation of payoffs (T > R > M1 > M2 > P > M 01 = M
0
2 = S)). (b) The set of Nash equilibria for each
of the 9 generic regions (b1 < a1; b2 < a2).
Figure 5.9 presents the equilibria for all possible social coefficients.
a2 < 2  1 (D;C) (D;C) (C;C) (C;C) (C;C)
2 = a2 (D;C) (D;C), (D;D), (C;C) (D;D), (C;C) (D;D), (C;C) (C;C)
b2 < 2 < a2 (D;D) (D;D), (C;C) (D;D), (C;C) (D;D), (C;C) (C;C)
2 = b2 (D;D) (D;D), (C;C) (D;D), (C;C) (C;D), (D;D), (C;C) (C;D)
0  2 < b2 (D;D) (D;D) (D;D) (C;D) (C;D)
0  1 < b1 1 = b1 b1 < 1 < a1 1 = a1 a1 < 1  1
Figure 5.9: Nash equilibria for different social coefficients for b1 < a1 and b2 < a2.
Now we consider the double game for the Prisoner’s Dilemma where the social (altruistic) coefficient
of each player forms a finite discrete set of incomplete information or types thus giving rise to a
Bayesian game.
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5.4 Double Game with Incomplete Information
We now assume that the players do not know each other’s social coefficients prior to any game, which
means that they do not know the full values of the payoff matrix. Thus, the game has two-sided
incomplete information. We assume that the social coefficient of each player has a finite number of
possible values and that the probability distribution of the social coefficient is common knowledge
between the two players. We also assume that, at the start of the game, each player is aware of
the value of its own social coefficient (private information) or type, but not the value of the social
coefficient of the opponent. In that way, each player can rely on a probabilistic inference to predict the
opponent’s actions. From Figures 5.7 and 5.9, we see immediately that for extreme types 1; 2 = 0; 1,
we have the pure Nash Equilibrium (D;D), (C;D), (D;C) and (C;C) and it follows immediately
that in both cases of a1 < b1, a2 < b2, and b1 < a1, b2 < a2, we have pure regular games.
We present two specific examples with finite sets of types for two players. Assume that
T > R > M > P > M 0 = S and a1 < b1; a2 < b2
Example 5.1. We choose the four discrete values, or types,
11 = 0; 
2
1 = a1; 
3
1 = b1; 
4
1 = 1;
12 = 0; 
2
2 = a2; 
3
2 = b2; 
4
2 = 1:
Note that 21; 
2
2; 
3
1; 
3
2 give the values at the boundaries of the three generic regions in the unit
square with each other. Figure 5.10 gives the set of Nash equilibria for all possible pairs (m1 ; 
n
2 )
(0  m;n  4).
42 (D;C) (D;C) (C;C), (D;C) (C;C)
32 (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C), (C;C) (C;C), (C;D)
22 (D;D), (D;C) (D;D), (D;C), (C;D) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D)
12 (D;D) (D;D), (C;D) (C;D) (C;D)
11 
2
1 
3
1 
4
1
Figure 5.10: Nash equilibria for different social coefficients for a1 < b1 and a2 < b2 with four types per player.
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From this figure, we see that for pairs of types where there is a choice of pure Nash Equilibrium, we
can choose a pure Nash Equilibrium such that we obtain Figure 5.11.
42 (D;C) (D;C) (C;C) (C;C)
32 (D;C) (D;C) (C;C) (C;C)
22 (D;D) (D;D) (C;D) (C;D)
12 (D;D) (D;D) (C;D) (C;D)
11 
2
1 
3
1 
4
1
Figure 5.11: Nash equilibria chosen for different social coefficients from Figure 5.10.
From Figure 5.11, we see that the double game is completely pure regular with (DDCC;DDCC) as
a pure Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Example 5.2. We take 5 discrete values, or types for each player as follows,
11 = 0; 
2
1 = a1; 
3
1 =
a1 + b1
2
; 41 = b1; 
5
1 = 1;
12 = 0; 
2
2 = a2; 
3
2 =
a2 + b2
2
; 42 = b2; 
5
2 = 1:
Figure 5.12 gives the set of Nash equilibria for all possible pairs (i1; 
j
2) (0  i; j  5).
52 (D;C) (D;C) (D;C) (C;C), (D;C) (C;C)
42 (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C), (C;C) (C;C), (C;D)
32 (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D)
22 (D;D), (D;C) (D;D), (D;C), (C;D) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D), (D;C) (C;D)
12 (D;D) (D;D), (C;D) (C;D) (C;D) (C;D)
11 
2
1 
3
1 
4
1 
5
1
Figure 5.12: Nash equilibria for different social coefficients for a1 < b1, a2 < b2 with five types per player.
From this figure, we can see that the double game is not completely pure regular.
Chapter 6
Multi-Games with N Players
In this chapter, we extend the concept of multi-games to consider games with N players
and M games. Each player has the same set of strategies in the M basic games. We
later define the class of pure regular multi-game where, for pairs of extreme types there
are pure Nash equilibria in which the strategy of each player only depends on its own
type. Similarly, we define the notion of a completely pure regular multi-game where
there are pure Nash equilibria for all possible pairs of types for the N players, in which
the strategy of each player only depends on its own type. We then go on to derive a test
for establishing whether multi-games are completely pure regular and show that a pure
Bayesian equilibrium for a completely pure regular multi-game can be obtained directly
from this test, thus reducing the complexity of computation.
We suppose our multi-game with M basic games is uniform. For each type of player i 2 I =
f1; : : : ; Ng, there are M points i1; i2; : : : ; iM in the Euclidean space, RM . In other words, for all
j 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg and a player i, we have a set of all possible types i = f(i1; i2; : : : ; iM) :
ij  0;
PM
j=1 ij = 1g. Each type i = (i1; i2; : : : ; iM) for player i is equipped with a set of M
weights ij with
PM
j=1 ij = 1. The standard (M   1)-simplex is the subset of RM given by
M 1ij = f(i1; i2; : : : ; iM) 2 RM j
MX
j=1
ij = 1 ^ ij  0 8jg:
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The simplex M 1ij lies in the affine hyperplane H of dimension M -1 that is called the extreme face
for player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng, where j 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg. Figure 6.1 shows the hyperplane H of
dimension 2 for the set 2 for player 2 whereM = 3.
23
21
22
(0; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 0)
(1; 0; 0)
H
Figure 6.1: Illustration of a simplex of 2 in a multi-game with three games.
In the finite discrete case, the finite set of types for each player is given by a set of types, say ki =
(ki1; 
k
i2; : : : ; 
k
iM), k = f1; : : : ;M; : : : ; `ig where `i is the number of types for player i 2 I =
f1; : : : ; Ng and M is the number of games, and each type is restricted to its unit interval. For every
game j 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg, each player has an extreme type consisting of one component with value
1 and the rest with value 0;
jin = jn =
(
1; j = n;
0; j 6= n:
We let game G(1;:::;i;:::;N ) where i = (i1; i2; : : : ; iM), denote the multi-game G with the types
taking the specific types 1; : : : ; i; : : : ; N . In the discrete case, additionally we let game Gk1k2kN
denote the multi-game G with types k11 ; k22 ; : : : ; kNN selected for N players respectively. We refer
to a Nash equilibrium for game G(1;:::;N ) as a local Nash equilibrium for the multi-game G. In the
continuous case, we let game G12N denote the multi-game G with types 1; 2; : : : ; N selected for
the N players respectively.
Assume that we have a uniform N-player multi-game G with basic games G1 to GM . Given a player
i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng, we denote, as usual, the strategy set of the opponent of i by S i. We denote the
set of types for players other than player i by  i.
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Next, we explain how information about the set of local pure Nash equilibria for multi-games withM
games for various types of N players, can be used to deduce the Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the
multi-games.
6.1 Pure Regular Multi-Games
We say a multi-game is pure regular if it has a set of MN pure Nash equilibria for all players for
their extreme types, and that the strategy of each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng only depends on its own
extreme type, which we re-label as sij 2 Si where j 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg is the game for the extreme
type.
Definition 6.1. We say a multi-game with a finite set of types for each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng, is
pure regular if there are actions siji 2 Si for i 2 I and ji 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg such that the strategy
profiles (s1j1 ; : : : ; siji ; : : : ; sNjN ) are pure Nash equilibria for the multi-game with player i having
extreme types jii with respect to game ji.
In other words, we can think of pure regularity as anM:N tuple of actions (s11; : : : ; s1M ; s21; : : : ; s2M ;
: : : ; si1; : : : ; siM ; : : : ; sN1; : : : ; sNM) in which within each block (si1; : : : ; siM) for a player i 2 I =
f1; : : : ; Ng there is a strategy corresponding to a particular game ji 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg. If we choose
one strategy from each block then we have a strategy profile that is a pure Nash equilibrium for the
multi-game with player i having extreme types jii with respect to game ji.
Figure 6.2 shows a pure regular multi-game G with three players and three games, each player has a
strategy set: S1 = fs11; s12; s13g, S2 = fs21; s22; s23g and S3 = fs31; s32; s33g. We suppose that G
has a set ofMN = 33 = 27 pure Nash equilibrium with three players having extreme types, for which
the strategy of each player only depends on its own type. We say that the 33 = 27 strategy profiles
induce pure regularity.
Figure 6.3 shows simplices for a pure regular multi-game G with two players and three games, each
player has a strategy set: S1 = fs11; s12; s13g and S2 = fs21; s22; s23g. We set the same colours for
the same Nash equilibria.
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s 22
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s 13
s 23
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33 = 1
32 = 1
31 = 1
11 = 1
12 = 1
13 = 1 21 = 1
22 = 1
23 = 1
Figure 6.2: The pure regular strategies for all extreme types within a pure regular multi-game of three games and three players.
6.2 Completely Pure Regular Multi-Games
We say a multi-game is completely pure regular if it has a set of pure Nash equilibrium for all types
ki , for which the strategy of each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng only depends on its own type. In other
words, the optimal response of each player only depends on its type. For each player i, there are li
types and each type is a vector withM components.
Definition 6.2. We say a multi-game with a finite set of types for each player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng
given by ki (1  k  `i) is completely pure regular if there are pure strategies sk 2 Si for (1 
k  `i) such that the strategy profiles (sk1 ; : : : ; ski ; : : : ; skN ) are pure Nash equilibria for the game
Gk1kikN for (1  ki  `i).
It is clear that a completely pure regular multi-game is pure regular and thus our terminology is
consistent.
The following example shows a multi-game G with two players and three games such that G is pure
regular but G is not complete pure regular. Therefore, pure regularity in a multi-game is not a sufficient
condition to guarantee that a multi-game is completely pure regular.
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23
22
21
23
22
21
(s11; s23)
(s11; s22)(s11; s21)
1 : 11 = 1
1 : 12 = 1
1 : 13 = 1
23
22
21
(s12; s23)
(s12; s22)(s12; s21)
(s13; s23)
(s13; s22)(s13; s21)
(a)
13
12
11
(s13; s21)
(s12; s21)(s11; s21)
2 : 21 = 1
2 : 22 = 1
2 : 23 = 1
(s13; s22)
(s12; s22)(s11; s22)
13
12
11
13
12
11
(s13; s23)
(s12; s23)(s11; s23)
(b)
Figure 6.3: The extreme faces in a pure regular multi-game with three games and two players.
Example 6.1. Consider a multi-game G with three games and two players. Each player has a strategy
set: S1 = fs11; s12; s13g and S2 = fs21; s22; s23g, with the payoff matrices of the three basic games
given in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.5(a) shows the pure Nash equilibria for G with player 1 and player 2 having their extreme
types. As shown in the figure, the strategy of each player only depends on its own extreme type, thus
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Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Pl
ay
er
1 s11 (3; 3) (3; 2) (3; 2)
s12 (2; 3) (2; 2:5) (2; 2)
s13 (2; 3) (2; 2) (2; 1)
(a) Game 1
Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Pl
ay
er
1 s11 (2; 2) (2; 3) (2; 2)
s12 (3; 2) (3; 3) (3; 1)
s13 (2; 2) (2; 3) (2; 1)
(b) Game 2
Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Pl
ay
er
1 s11 (2; 2) (2; 2) (1; 3)
s12 (2; 2) (2; 2) (2; 3)
s13 (3; 2) (3; 1) (3; 3)
(c) Game 3
Figure 6.4: Payoff matrices representation for Example 6.1 (1).
G is pure regular. Figure 6.5(b) shows that for the given set of type 2 = (14 ; 14 ; 12) for player 2 and
extreme types for players 1, there are pure Nash equilibria but with different strategies for player 2,
thus G is not complete pure regular.
2 : 21 = 1 2 : 22 = 1 2 : 23 = 1
1 : 11 = 1 (s11; s21) (s11; s22) (s11; s23)
1 : 12 = 1 (s12; s21) (s12; s22) (s12; s23)
1 : 13 = 1 (s13; s21) (s13; s22) (s13; s23)
(a)
2 : (
1
4
; 1
4
; 1
2
)
1 : 11 = 1 (s11; s23)
1 : 12 = 1 (s12; s22)
1 : 13 = 1 (s13; s21)
(b)
Figure 6.5: Illustration of pure Nash equilibria for a variety of extreme types in Example 6.1 (1).
Figure 6.6 illustrates vector 2 = (14 ;
1
4
; 1
2
) for extreme types for player 1. The green zone shows a
subset of 2 that G, with respect to extreme types for player 1 and this subset, has a Nash equilibrium
for, while player 2’s strategy is s23. Similarly, the blue zone and yellow zone are corresponding to
pure Nash equilibria in which strategies of player 2 are s22 and s21 respectively.
1 : 11 = 1
(1; 0; 0)
(0; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 0)
2
22
23
21
1 : 12 = 1
(1; 0; 0)
(0; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 0)
2
22
23
21
(1; 0; 0)
(0; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 0)
2
22
23
21
1 : 13 = 1
Figure 6.6: Illustration of different zones of pure Nash equilibrium for types of player 2.
Now, assume the payoff matrices of the three basic games are given as in Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.8(a) represents the pure Nash equilibria for G with player 1 and player 2 having extreme
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Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Pl
ay
er
1 s11 (3; 3) (3; 2) (3; 2)
s12 (2; 3) (2; 2) (2; 2)
s13 (2; 3) (2; 2) (2; 2)
(a) Game 1
Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Pl
ay
er
1 s11 (2; 2) (2; 3) (2; 2)
s12 (3; 2) (3; 3) (3; 2)
s13 (2; 2) (2; 3) (2; 2)
(b) Game 2
Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Pl
ay
er
1 s11 (2; 2) (2; 2) (2; 3)
s12 (2; 2) (2; 2) (2; 3)
s13 (3; 2) (3; 2) (3; 3)
(c) Game 3
Figure 6.7: Payoff matrices representation for Example 6.1 (2).
types. The strategy of each player only depends on its own extreme type as shown in the figure, thus
G is pure regular. Figure 6.8(b) shows that for a given set of types 2 = (14 ; 14 ; 12) for player 2 and
extreme types for player 1, there are pure Nash equilibria but with similar strategies for player 2, thus
G is complete pure regular for type 2 = (14 ; 14 ; 12).
2 : 21 = 1 2 : 22 = 1 2 : 23 = 1
1 : 11 = 1 (s11; s21) (s11; s22) (s11; s23)
1 : 12 = 1 (s12; s21) (s12; s22) (s12; s23)
1 : 13 = 1 (s13; s21) (s13; s22) (s13; s23)
(a)
2 : (
1
4
; 1
4
; 1
2
)
1 : 11 = 1 (s11; s23)
1 : 12 = 1 (s12; s23)
1 : 13 = 1 (s13; s23)
(b)
Figure 6.8: Illustration of pure Nash equilibria for a variety of extreme types in Example 6.1 (2).
In the following sections, we introduce an algorithm in order to establish whether we have a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium which can be determined with lower computational complexity. With respect to the
number of games M , this algorithm is applicable while the set of types i for each player i 2 I =
f1; : : : ; Ng is split into at most M disjoint sets. Therefore, for applying the algorithm we restrict
ourselves to having only at most M possible actions for each player to guarantee the set of types i
for each player i is split into at mostM disjoint sets. The following example represents a multi-game
with two players and three games. One of the players can choose more than three actions (more than
the number of games), which results in the set of types 1 for player 1 is split into 4 disjoint sets,
more than the algorithm would be able to use to give a suitable result.
Example 6.2. Consider a multi-game G with three games and two players. Player 1 has the strategy
set S1 = fs11; s12; s13; s14g and player 2 has the strategy set S2 = fs21; s22; s23g, with the payoff
matrices of the three basic games given in Figure 6.9.
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Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Pl
ay
er
1 s11 (3; 2:5) (3; 2) (3; 2)
s12 (1:5; 2:5) (1; 2:3) (2; 2)
s13 (2:5; 3:1) (2; 3) (2; 2)
s14 (2:9; 3:1) (2:5; 3) (2; 2)
(a) Game 1
Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Pl
ay
er
1 s11 (2; 2) (1; 3) (2; 2)
s12 (3:5; 2) (3; 3) (3; 2)
s13 (3; 2) (2; 3) (2; 2)
s14 (3; 2) (2; 3) (2; 2)
(b) Game 2
Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Pl
ay
er
1 s11 (2; 2) (2; 2) (2; 3)
s12 (2; 2) (2; 2) (2; 3)
s13 (3; 2) (3; 2) (3; 3)
s14 (2:5; 2) (2; 2) (2; 3)
(c) Game 3
Figure 6.9: Payoff matrices representation for Example 6.2.
Figure 6.10 (a) shows the pure Nash equilibria for the extreme types of player 1 and player 2. The
strategy of each player only depends on its own extreme type as shown in the figure, thus G is pure
regular. Strategy profile (s14; s21) is a pure Nash equilibrium for G with player 1 and player 2 having
types 1 = (12 ;
1
2
; 0) and 2 = (1; 0; 0) respectively.
2 : 21 = 1 2 : 22 = 1 2 : 23 = 1
1 : 11 = 1 (s11; s21) (s11; s22) (s11; s23)
1 : 12 = 1 (s12; s21) (s12; s22) (s12; s23)
1 : 13 = 1 (s13; s21) (s13; s22) (s13; s23)
(a)
2 : 21 = 1
1 : 11 = 1 (s11; s21)
1 : 12 = 1 (s12; s21)
1 : 13 = 1 (s13; s21)
1 = (
1
2
; 1
2
; 0) (s14; s21)
(b)
Figure 6.10: Illustration of pure Nash equilibria for a variety of extreme types in Example 6.2.
Figure 6.11 shows four different zones of pure Nash equilibrium for G with player 1 and player 2
having type 1 2 1 and 2 = (1; 0; 0) respectively and the set of types 1 is split into 4 disjoint sets.
12
13
11
2 : 21 = 1
(s13; s21)
(s12; s21)
(s14; s21)
(s11; s21)
Figure 6.11: Illustration of a simplex with four different zones of pure Nash equilibria.
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Theorem 6.1. If a multi-game is completely pure regular, then for all conditional probability distri-
butions for the types of the N players, the Bayesian pure strategy (s1(:); s2(:); : : : ; sN(:)), is a pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is similar to proof Theorem 4.1.
6.3 Separatrix Hyperplane
In a pure regular multi-game G, assume all extreme types for the players other than player i 2 I =
f1; : : : ; Ng are fixed. Let ui(s1j1 ; : : : ; siji ; : : : ; sNjN ) = i:aij1jijN be the utility payoff for player i
with type i. For a given type i2I , strategy profile (s1j1 ; : : : ; siji ; : : : ; sNjN ) is a Nash equilibrium if
i:aij1jijN  i:aij1kijN ; where ji; ki 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg and ji 6= ki:
We let;
Pi;j1jijN ;j1kijN (i) = i:(aij1jijN   aij1kijN )  0;
Si;j1jijN ;j1kijN = fijPi;j1jijN ;j1kijN (i) = 0g:
The hyperplane Si;j1jijN ;j1kijN is a separatrix hyperplane in G. This separates the space of the
types for player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng where ji; ki 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg; ji 6= ki, and the extreme types
of the other players are fixed.
Like in a double game a multi-game is completely pure regular if the set of types is partitioned into
polytopes with constant Nash Equilibria. Figure 6.12 shows an example of a simplex of a multi-game
G with four games and two players, Each player has a strategy set: S1 = fs11; s12; s13; ; s14g and
S2 = fs21; s22; s23; ; s24g, separated by six separatrix hyperplanes while 1 = (1; 0; 0).
The following example shows a multi-game G in which the separatrix hyperplanes do not intersect
each other on the extreme face.
Example 6.3. Consider a multi-game G with three games and two players. Player 1 has the strategy
set S1 = fs11; s12; s13g and player 2 has the strategy set S2 = fs21; s22; s23g, with the payoff matrices
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24
23
22
21
(a)
(s11; s21)
(s11; s22)
(s11; s23)
(s11; s24)
1 : 11 = 1
S2;13;14
S2;11;14
(b)
Figure 6.12: Illustration of separatrix hyperplanes in a multi-game whereM = 4 andN = 2.
of the three basic games given in Figure 6.13.
Player 2
s21 s22 s23
Player 1
s11 (3; 2:5) (3; 2) (3; 2)
s12 (1:5; 2:5) (1; 2:3) (2; 2)
s13 (2:5; 3:1) (2; 3) (2; 2)
(a) Game 1
Player 2
s21 s22 s23
s11 (2; 2) (1; 3) (2; 2)
s12 (3:5; 2) (3; 3) (3; 2)
s13 (3; 2) (2; 3) (2; 2)
(b) Game 2
Player 2
s21 s22 s23
s11 (2; 2) (2; 2) (2; 3)
s12 (2; 2) (2; 2) (2; 3)
s13 (3; 2) (3; 2) (3; 3)
(c) Game 3
Figure 6.13: Payoff matrices representation for three games.
Figure 6.14 shows an extreme face for player 1 separated by three separatrix hyperplanes while player
2 has chosen type 2 = (1; 0; 0). Note the separatrix hyperplanes do not intersect each other on the
extreme face in this particular example.
(1; 0; 0)
(0; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 0)
12
13
11
(a)
2 : 21 = 1
12
13
11
(s13; s21)
(s12; s21)(s11; s21)
(b)
Figure 6.14: Illustration of a simplex while the separatrix hyperplanes do not intersect each other on the extreme face.
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Now, we present a test for establishing that a multi-game is completely pure regular.
6.4 Boundary Test
Consider a multi-game G withM games and N players. Let;
si(:) : i ! Si; i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng;
si : i 7! sij if i 2 ij; j 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg;
si(i) = sij:
where i is a set of types for each player i, ij  i. Let (1; : : : ; N ) be a set of types for the
N -player multi-game G. For a pure regular G, the boundary test is defined as follows:
• For each type i, i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng, we test if there is a constant pure strategy sij such that the
strategy profiles (s1j; : : : ; sij; : : : ; sNj) where j 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg, are pure Nash equilibria
for all extreme types for all players other than player i 2 I with respect to game j 2 J .
A multi-game G satisfies the boundary test if it is completely pure regular on the boundary i.e. when
all types except for a single player are extreme.
Theorem 6.2. Amulti-game G is completely pure regular if, and only if, G is pure regular, and satisfies
the boundary test.
Proof. ()) The working assumption is that the multi-game G is completely pure regular. Bearing
in mind Definition 6.1 and Definition 6.2, if we restrict the types to extreme types, then G is pure
regular. As G is completely pure regular, if we restrict the types to boundary types then G satisfies the
boundary test.
( ) Let (1; : : : ; N ) be a set of types for the N -player multi-game G. If the test succeeds then for all
extreme types for the players other than player i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ng and for each type i2I ,
Pi;j1jijN ;j1kijN (i) = i:(aij1jijN   aij1kijN )  0;
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where i:aij1jijN is the utility payoff for player i with type i and ji; ki 2 J = f1; : : : ;Mg; ji 6= ki.
We observe that i:(aij1jijN  aij1kijN )  0 is independent of  i. Therefore, each i is in one of
the disjoint sets ij . In addition the set of types i for each player i is split by separatrix hyperplanes
into at mostM disjoint sets
i =
M[
j=1
ij; ij \ij0 = ;; j 6= j0; j0 2 J; i 2 I:
Let si(:) : i ! Si, si : i 7! siji if i 2 iji . Based on our assumption, for each type i2I 2 iji ,
s(i) = siji such that;
Pi;j1jijN ;j1kijN (i) = i:(aij1jijN   aij1kijN )  0:
Therefore, the strategy profile (s1j1 ; : : : ; siji ; : : : ; sNjN ) is a Nash equilibrium for G 1N such that
siji only depends on player i’s type. Thus G is completely pure regular.
Figure 6.15 represents disjoint sets of types for a multi-game G with three games and two players, at
the boundary types of two players.
By applying Theorem 6.2, Algorithm 2 can be employed to establish whether a multi-game G with
finite types for the N players andM games is completely pure regular.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm to test for the property of being complete pure regular in multi-game G with N
players andM games.
Input: An N-player multi-game G withM games.
Output: Multi-game G is complete pure regular or not.
1 CPR(G): Game G is completely pure regular.
2 PR(G): Game G is pure regular.
3 begin
4 if CPR(G) = PR(G) and the boundary test succeeds.
5 then
6 G is completely pure regular
7 else
8 G is not completely pure regular
9 end
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23
21 22
S2;11;13
S2;12;13
S2;11;12
(0; 0; 1)
(1; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0)
1 : 11 = 1
23
21 22
S2;21;23
S2;22;23
S2;21;22
(0; 0; 1)
(1; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0)
1 : 12 = 1
23
21 22
S2;32;33
S2;31;33
S2;31;32
(0; 0; 1)
(1; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0)
1 : 13 = 1
2
2
2
(s11; s21)
(s12; s21)
(s13; s21)
(s11; s22)
(s12; s22)
(s13; s22)
(s11; s23)
(s12; s23)
(s13; s23)
Types of the second player
(a)
13
11 12
(0; 0; 1)
(1; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0)
2 : 21 = 1
13
11 12
(0; 0; 1)
(1; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0)
2 : 22 = 1
13
11 12
S1;11;21
S1;12;22
S1;13;23
S1;21;31
S1;22;32
S1;23;33
S1;11;31
S1;12;32
S1;13;33
(0; 0; 1)
(1; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0)
2 : 23 = 1
1
1
1
(s11; s21)
(s11; s22)
(s11; s23)
(s12; s21)
(s12; s22)
(s12; s23)
(s13; s21)
(s13; s22)
(s13; s23)
Types of the first player
(b)
Figure 6.15: Disjoint sets of types for a multi-game G with three games and two players at boundary types.
Corollary 6.1. Given any multi-game with a finite number of types for N players andM games, we
can decide if it is completely pure regular with computational complexity O
 
NMN 1

.
Proof. In a multi-game, the number of extreme faces when considering all combinations of extreme
types is NMN 1. Since Algorithm 2 checks the extreme faces, thus the computational complexity is
O
 
NMN 1

.
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For a given number of players, the complexity of this algorithm is polynomial in M , the number
of strategies. For the class of completely pure regular multi-games, the Nash equilibria of the basic
games can be used to compute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the multi-games with respect to the
number of players and games. Let M `i denotes the number strategies for player i in the expanded
game therefore the number of strategies is M ` where ` = max1iN `i. If finding Nash equilibrium
is “hard” in terms of the number of strategies, then the classical complexity is O(2M`) which is large
even if ` andM are small compared to O(NMN 1) which is polynomial inM for a given N .
Figure 6.16 and Figure 6.17 represent the extreme faces of the completely pure regular 3- player
multi-game with three games, each player has a strategy set: S1 = fs11; s12; s13g, S2 = fs21; s22; s23g
and S3 = fs31; s32; s33g. We set the same colours for the same Nash equilibria. Algorithm 2 checks
27 extreme faces for this game.
13
12
11
(s13; s21; s31)
(s12; s21; s31)
(s11; s21; s31)
2 : 21 = 1
3 : 31 = 1
23
22
21
(s11; s23; s31)
(s11; s22; s31)
(s11; s21; s31)
1 : 11 = 1
3 : 31 = 1
33
32
31
(s11; s21; s33)
(s11; s21; s32)
(s11; s21; s31)
1 : 11 = 1
2 : 21 = 1
13
12
11
(s13; s21; s32)
(s12; s21; s32)
(s11; s21; s32)
2 : 21 = 1
3 : 32 = 1
23
22
21
(s11; s23; s32)
(s11; s22; s32)
(s11; s21; s32)
1 : 11 = 1
3 : 32 = 1
33
32
31
(s11; s22; s33)
(s11; s22; s32)
(s11; s22; s31)
1 : 11 = 1
2 : 22 = 1
13
12
11
(s13; s21; s33)
(s12; s21; s33)
(s11; s21; s33)
2 : 21 = 1
3 : 33 = 1
23
22
21
(s11; s23; s33)
(s11; s22; s33)
(s11; s21; s33)
1 : 11 = 1
3 : 33 = 1
33
32
31
(s11; s23; s33)
(s11; s23; s32)
(s11; s23; s31)
1 : 11 = 1
2 : 23 = 1
Figure 6.16: The extreme faces of the completely pure regular 3- player multi-game with three games (1).
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13
12
11
(s13; s22; s31)
(s12; s22; s31)
(s11; s22; s31)
2 : 22 = 1
3 : 31 = 1
23
22
21
(s12; s23; s31)
(s12; s22; s31)
(s12; s21; s31)
1 : 12 = 1
3 : 31 = 1
33
32
31
(s12; s21; s33)
(s12; s21; s32)
(s12; s21; s31)
1 : 12 = 1
2 : 21 = 1
13
12
11
(s13; s22; s32)
(s12; s22; s32)
(s11; s22; s32)
2 : 22 = 1
3 : 32 = 1
23
22
21
(s12; s23; s32)
(s12; s22; s32)
(s12; s21; s32)
1 : 12 = 1
3 : 32 = 1
33
32
31
(s12; s22; s33)
(s12; s22; s32)
(s12; s22; s31)
1 : 12 = 1
2 : 22 = 1
13
12
11
(s13; s22; s33)
(s12; s22; s33)
(s11; s22; s33)
2 : 22 = 1
3 : 33 = 1
23
22
21
(s12; s23; s33)
(s12; s22; s33)
(s12; s21; s33)
1 : 12 = 1
3 : 33 = 1
33
32
31
(s12; s23; s33)
(s12; s23; s32)
(s12; s23; s31)
1 : 12 = 1
2 : 23 = 1
13
12
11
(s13; s23; s31)
(s12; s23; s31)
(s11; s23; s31)
2 : 23 = 1
3 : 31 = 1
23
22
21
(s13; s23; s31)
(s13; s22; s31)
(s13; s21; s31)
1 : 13 = 1
3 : 31 = 1
33
32
31
(s13; s21; s33)
(s13; s21; s32)
(s13; s21; s31)
1 : 13 = 1
2 : 21 = 1
13
12
11
(s13; s23; s32)
(s12; s23; s32)
(s11; s23; s32)
2 : 23 = 1
3 : 32 = 1
23
22
21
(s13; s23; s32)
(s13; s22; s32)
(s13; s21; s32)
1 : 13 = 1
3 : 32 = 1
33
32
31
(s13; s22; s33)
(s13; s22; s32)
(s13; s22; s31)
1 : 13 = 1
2 : 22 = 1
13
12
11
(s13; s23; s33)
(s12; s23; s33)
(s11; s23; s33)
2 : 23 = 1
3 : 33 = 1
23
22
21
(s13; s23; s33)
(s13; s22; s33)
(s13; s21; s33)
1 : 13 = 1
3 : 33 = 1
33
32
31
(s13; s23; s33)
(s13; s23; s32)
(s13; s23; s31)
1 : 13 = 1
2 : 23 = 1
Figure 6.17: The extreme faces of the completely pure regular 3- player multi-game with three games (2).
Chapter 7
Simulation of Algorithms
A computer program is developed on the basis of the proposed Algorithm 1 and Algo-
rithm 2 in order to establish the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that can be
determined with lower computational complexity. For validation and verification of the
computer experiments, mathematical models were manually analysed according to the
coded algorithms and methodology. The results sufficiently support the results of the
software. The program was written in C# computer language.
What follows is more information about the computer program.
7.1 C# Implementation of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2
The implementation of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 was an important aspect to this research, as
it allowed the theoretical work to be put into perspective and provided an experimental test-bed for
the different results. It was created using C#, while Excel and Matlab were used to test the results
that assisted in the analysis of the algorithms. C# was the natural choice for implementation, due
to its object-oriented characteristics. These helped to increase the level of organization and software
engineering features in the code. The source code consists of two base classes, namely Form and
Controller. The program consists of approximately 2,000 lines of code. The simulation code is
available on https://github.com/alighoroghi/thesis.
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7.2 Inputs and Outputs
Here we explain the data that the user has to enter into the system.
1. The number of games can be between two and ten games.
2. The number of players can be between two and ten players.
3. The number of strategies per player can vary for each player but it can be between two and the
number of games being played.
4. For the number of types of players, we assume that every player has a set of extreme types (an
extreme type for each game) plus a user determined number of non-extreme types. The value
of non-extreme types can be randomly generated or chosen by the user.
5. Payoffs can be generated randomly or by the user.
6. The software indicates whether the multi-game is pure regular.
7. The software indicates whether the multi-game is completely pure regular. If yes, it shows the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
8. For more than one run of the simulation, users determine the number of games, the number of
players and the number of runs.
7.3 Implementation
This software contains two classes; Form and Controller. The Form class provides a graphical
user interface for taking the user inputs and displaying the results, while the Controller class
processes the user’s inputs and computes the results. Figure 7.1 shows a UML diagram for the C#
implementation of the algorithms.
Getting the user inputs:
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Controller
PlayerStrategiesCounts:Integer[]
Payoffs:Double[]
Weights:Double[]
GameCounts:Integer
PlayerCounts:Integer
ComputeAllNashForExtType()
CheckPR()
TestMultiGameCPR()
TestDoubleGameCPR()
SetInfo()
MultiDimToUnarDim()
Form
PlayerStrategiesCounts:Integer[]
payoffs:Double[]
Weights:Double[]
EachPlayerWeightCounts:Integer
CreateRandomPayoff()
CreateRandomType()
EnterData()
EnterPayoff()
EnterTypes()
CheckPR()
CheckCPR()
ComputeNash()
1
1
Figure 7.1: UML Diagram for the C# implementation of the algorithms.
• At first the user should input the number of games and players on the input tab and click on the
EnterData button to store these values.
• The EnterPayoff function stores each players’ payoffs.
• The EnterTypes function sets the non-extreme types (each player has six types).
Computing the results:
After setting the required values on the form the user should click on the Compute Nash button.
This results in calling up the function ComputeNash in the Form class, which updates the vari-
able values on the Controller class and calls up the ComputeAllNashForExtType. In this
function all Nash equilibria are calculated based on all combinations of player’s types. Then the
Controller class determines if the game is pure regular and stores the result in the ISPure-
Regular variable.
Displaying the results:
• The function CheckPR in the Form class checks the Controller’s conclusion stored in
ISPureRegular and notifies the user of whether the game was pure regular or not.
• The function CheckCPR in the Form class first checks if ISPureRegular is true and in
that case calls up the CheckCPR function in the Controller class, which then determines
7.4. Results of Simulations 89
whether the game is completely pure regular. The result is stored in the ISCompletePure-
Regular variable, and based on the result the Form class notifies the user of whether the game
was completely pure regular or not. To avoid the complexity resulting from a large number of
games or players, the inputs are formatted as lists using the function MultiDimToUnarDim.
7.4 Results of Simulations
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are simulated by generating 10,000 games with random payoffs and
non-extreme types. The number of players, games and strategies were varied. All the computational
experiments where run on a Windows machine with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7, 2.00GHz CPU and
8GB of RAM.
To evaluate the results, we compute the number of double games or multi-games which have pure
Nash equilibria when all players have extreme types (# of NE-ET). Similarly, we also compute the
number of pure regular games (# of PRs) and completely pure regular games (# of CPRs).
First we discuss the results of the simulation for the double game. Figure 7.2 shows the results
obtained from the simulation. A percentage for (# of NE-ET), (# of PRs) and (# of CPRs) were
calculated for a varying number of types for each player (2 to 30 types) and compared to each other
while the number of players are two, then three, four and five.
Figure 7.2 (a) shows that 70% of the two-player simulated double games had pure Nash equilibrium
when each player chose one of his extreme types. Results also show that 51% of the games were pure
regular, 5% more than the number of games that were completely pure regular. This means that on
average, 73% of games with pure Nash equilibrium for extreme types are pure regular, which also
contributes to 66% of the completely pure regular games. Figure 7.2 (b) shows a 3-player double
game. We can see from the games simulated that only 32% had pure Nash equilibrium for extreme
types, almost half as many as that of a two player double game. Similarly, the percentage of pure
regular games and completely pure regular games also dropped with results showing that only 20%
of games simulated were pure regular and 19%, completely pure regular. Figure 7.2(c) continues this
trend, showing that as the number of players in the double game increases, there is a decrease in the
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number of games with pure Nash equilibrium for extreme types. Only 15% of the 4-player double
games had pure Nash equilibrium for extreme types, while even less were pure regular games 10%
and completely pure regular games 9%. Figure 7.2 (d) also follows the trend of a decline in (# of
NE-ET), (# of PRs) and (# of CPRs) when the number of players increases to five.
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Figure 7.2: The simulation results for various numbers of players and types in the double game.
Figure 7.3 shows that about 69% of the two-player double games have pure Nash equilibrium when
the players select their extreme types. The percentage of games that are pure regular is about 51% and
the percentage of games that are completely pure regular is about 45%. Pooling the data according to
the number of players and the number of double games suggests that there is a concerning decrease
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in (# of NE-ET), (# of PRs) and (# of CPRs) when the number of players increases.
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Figure 7.3: The simulation results for various numbers of players in the double game.
Now, we consider multi-games consisting of three games. Figure 7.4 (a, b) illustrates the percentages
for (# of NE-ET), (# of PRs) and (# of CPRs) that were calculated for the varying number of types
for each player. These were compared to each other while the number of players were two and three.
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Figure 7.4: The simulation results for various numbers of players and types in the 3-game multi-game.
Figure 7.5 shows that about 33% percent of the multi-games with two players and three games have
pure Nash equilibrium when the players utilise their extreme types. The percentage of pure regular
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games is about 14% while the percentage of completely pure regular games is about 5%. The per-
centages for (# of NE-ET), (# of PRs) and (# of CPRs) have dramatically decreased as the number
of players increases.
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Figure 7.5: The simulation results for various numbers of players in the 3-game multi-game.
Figure 7.6 shows the results obtained from the simulation of varying numbers of types for each player,
in the case of a multi-game consisting of four games and 2 players.
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Figure 7.6: The simulation results for various number of types in the multi-game with four games and two players.
Figure 7.7 (a, b) represents the results obtained from the simulation of varying numbers of games
containing two players and three players and two non-extreme types for each player. The results of
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the computer simulation indicate that both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 can perform more efficiently
when the double games and multi games have fewer players, compared to when they have to accom-
modate a larger number. Results show a decline in the number of games with pure Nash equilibrium
for extreme types and consequently pure regular games and completely pure regular games as the
number of players rises. Similarly, as the number of games increase, the algorithms perform less
effectively.
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Figure 7.7: The simulation results for various numbers of games in the multi-game forN = 2 andN = 3 and two non-extreme types for each player.
It is also evident that the number of non-extreme types does not affect the number of games with
pure Nash equilibrium for extreme types, as well as the number of pure regular and completely pure
regular games.
Chapter 8
Iterated Multi-Game
The multi-games become more interesting when we have repeated interactions and the
players come to compete over a number of rounds. In this chapter, we introduce some
attempts to apply repeated double games with incomplete information in order to analyze
the effectiveness of strategies within iterated double games.
We let double game G (the stage game) be played a finite number of times. The following attempts
used the style of a round robin tournament. A round robin tournament involves a group of players
who play each other in turn at a number of rounds of the game. Each new round gives the player a
better insight into her/his opponent and allows them to make decisions on the basis of her/his previous
experience. We assumed that in the repeated double game, players are able to change their type for
each round following repeated interactions in the round robin tournament, and so this model seems
more rational and akin to real life.
8.1 Iterated Double Game for the Transactional Analysis Example
Recall example 3.2, where we discussed the transactional analysis, some strategies were designed for
the iterated double game according to [Gho10]. The structure of the tournament was round-robin,
and, thus, all the strategies in the iterated double game competed against all the other strategies and
against themselves once. It was assumed that each player plays in response to actions that were
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chosen by her/him and the opponent before. The results of the simulation of 13 strategies showed that
the Tit-for-Tat strategy had a higher average expected value of payoffs for variation of i for player
i 2 f1; 2g in 200 iterations.
In the Tit-for-Tat strategy, it is assumed that the attractiveness of the action AA is greater than AC,
while AC is more attractive than CA, and CA is more attractive than CC. At stage t = 0, player
i plays AA. From stage t = 1 to t = T , player i looks at the previous actions of both players;
if both actions are the same, player i plays the same action; if the attractiveness of the opponent’s
action is less than player i’s action, s/he plays an action with equal or greater attractiveness than the
other player’s last action; otherwise, s/he repeats the opponent’s last action. For example, if player 1
chose CA and player 2 chose CC in the previous stage, player 1 plays AA, AC, or CA, all with a 1
3
probability. If player 1 chose CC and player 2 chose CA in the previous stage, given that player 2
chose an action with higher attractiveness, player 1 then chooses CA in the current stage (the same as
player 2’s previous action).
8.2 Iterated Double Game with Morality Aspect
Recall the example in Section 5.4, two attempts were made to apply a repeated double game with a
morality aspect.
8.2.1 Iterated Double Game for Altruistic - the First attempt
A computer tournament of the double game was made to operate as a framework, testing the validity
of the theoretical results by comparing the performance of various competing strategies in [EGS12].
The structure of the tournament was a round-robin. Each game between any two strategies consisted
of 200 rounds and the total score of a strategy within a game was the sum of the payoffs acquired
from all the rounds. It was assumed that the numerical values for the payoff values are the following:
T = 5; R = 3; M = 2:5; P = 1; M 0 = 0 and S = 0
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A set of assumptions were made for the tournament:
• Given the aforementioned values for the payoffs, a strategy could score between 0 and 1000 in
a stage game.
• A score of 0 can be obtained through the player either using a strategy that has a social coeffi-
cient equal to 0 and cooperating throughout the entire game, while the opponent only defects,
or a strategy that has a social coefficient equal to 1 and defecting throughout the entire game,
irrespective of what the opponent does.
• On the other hand, a score of 1000 can only be obtained through a strategy that has a social
coefficient equal to 0 and defecting throughout the entire game, while the opponent only coop-
erates.
• A score of 200 can be obtained through two strategies that have social coefficients equal to 0
and mutual defection throughout the entire game.
• A score of 500 can be obtained through a strategy that has a social coefficient equal to 1 and
cooperation throughout the entire game, irrespective of what the opponent does.
• A score of 600 can be obtained through two strategies that have social coefficients equal to 0
and mutual cooperation throughout the entire game.
A significant aspect of the tournament was the selection of a social coefficient according to the
strategy. It was assumed that the social coefficient was part of a discrete set of five distinct values
0; a; a+b
2
; b; 1.
The strategies were allowed to change their social coefficients within the game and adapt them to the
environment they faced. However, since it is difficult to quantify exactly by how much human beings
change their social values, the strategies were allowed to change their social coefficients stepwise,
and, as a result, they could either increase them or decrease them by one value at any round. This
was done to avoid having strategies changing their social coefficients from a value of 0 to that of 1 in
a single round, since, it is believed that, only under extreme and unprecedented circumstances would
such a sudden change occur in one’s social values.
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The strategies participating in the tournament varied in several ways, such as the choice made for the
first round of the game and the initial social coefficient. Some strategies take into account the deci-
sions that the opponent has made up to the point of consideration in the game, some use probabilistic
estimations and even randomness in making their decisions, some have already made up their mind
and follow rules that do not change according to the flow of the game. In essence, a strategy consists
of an algorithm and so it operates according to certain instructions, changes the social coefficient and
provides the decision of whether to cooperate or defect.
The initial social coefficient of a strategy shows its intentions, since a low social coefficient usually
implies proneness to defection, a high social coefficient on the other hand implies cooperation. Vary-
ing initial social coefficients across tournaments means changing initial conditions, and, as a result,
dynamic environments. Certain strategies have complex ways for dealing with their opponents’ ini-
tial behaviour, and, so, what they may infer from it, may, in some cases, pre-determine the rest of the
course of the game. In addition, most strategies have algorithms that modify their social coefficient
in almost every round and adapt to the environment that has been developed from their opponents’
actions. Then, they can respond effectively to both cooperative and defective behaviours and not be
restricted by their choice of initial social coefficient.
As mentioned in the theoretical part of the analysis of the double game in Section 5.4, different kinds
of behaviour are observed when 1 and 2 change.
With 0  1  a and 0  2  a, the Nash equilibrium is provided by (D;D). For such social
coefficients, we expect to see defective behaviours, as strategies try to recognise their opponents’
intentions and see whether they can get away with defection, or if they will face retaliatory behaviour.
With a < 1 < b and a < 2 < b, the Nash equilibria are provided by (C;D) and (D;C). For
such social coefficients, the player who defects first has an advantage and dominates by gaining from
an opponent’s cooperation. However, with the increase of the social coefficient, cooperating can be
beneficial, since a player can gain the reward from the social game. In that way, a lot of strategies
change their behaviour at this stage and employ a cooperative approach to the game.
98 Chapter 8. Iterated Multi-Game
With b  1  1 and b  2  1, the Nash equilibrium is provided by (C;C). For such social
coefficients, strategies with cooperative behaviour can gain the social rewards and not suffer the social
punishments of the social game.
The following strategies were the main strategies used in [EGS12]:
SEG: SEG is based on two parts; deciding whether to cooperate or defect and altering the social
coefficient based on some pre-defined conditions. For the former, it behaves as the Nash equilibria
indicate, thus, its decision of whether to cooperate or defect depends only on the theoretical work and
the results drawn from it. For the latter, it changes its social coefficient according to the following
conditions:
• If SEG chooses C and its opponent chooses C in the previous round, it does not change its
social coefficient.
• If SEG chooses C and its opponent chooses D in the previous round, it increases its social
coefficient.
• If SEG chooses D and its opponent chooses C in the previous round, it decreases its social
coefficient.
• If SEG chooses D and its opponent chooses D in the previous round, it increases its social
coefficient.
ALLC: This strategy has an initial social coefficient equal to 0; it constantly chooses C and never
changes its social coefficient.
ALLD: This strategy has an initial social coefficient equal to 0; it constantly chooses D and never
changes its social coefficient.
Tit-for-Tat: During the first round, player i 2 f1; 2g cooperates and randomly chooses a moral
coefficient; during subsequent rounds, if the opponent cooperated in the previous round then player i
will increase her/his moral coefficient, and if her/his opponent defected then s/he will decrease her/his
moral coefficient in the current round.
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Positive-people strategy: During the first round, the player cooperates and randomly chooses a moral
coefficient; during subsequent rounds, if the opponent cooperated in the previous round then s/he will
increase her/his moral coefficient.
Negative-people strategy: During the first round, the player cooperates and randomly chooses a
moral coefficient; during subsequent rounds, if her/his opponent defected then s/he will decrease her
moral coefficient in the current round.
Nonsense-people strategy: During the first round, the player cooperates and randomly chooses a
moral coefficient; during subsequent rounds, regardless of whether the opponent defected or cooper-
ated in the previous round, s/he will not change her/his moral coefficient in the current round.
The results of the tournament showed that the winning strategy was SEG, as its average and cumula-
tive scores were much higher than those of any other participating strategy. Its algorithm is a mixture
of the results of theoretical work and some conditions on how to alter its social coefficient, so as to
adapt to the course of action of any game. It works on the principle of adjusting its social coeffi-
cient based not only on its opponent’s behaviour, but its own as well. If its opponent defected and
it either cooperated or defected in the previous round, it increases its social coefficient to avoid the
disastrous cycles of mutual defection that would be caused by a low social coefficient. It should also
be mentioned that its initial social coefficient was 0, the result of which was that in the first round it
defects.
8.2.2 Iterated Double Game for Altruistic - the Second Attempt
The most recent study about the repeated double game was conducted by Boyd [Boy12] using the
framework of a tournament. The participants in the study included computer science, game theory,
and machine-learning researchers as well as university students of varying educational levels. The
aim of the study was to create a model for recording the effectiveness of strategies within iterated
double games.
In Boyd’s study, participants were offered a type of financial reward in order to encourage them to
be willing to document and share their strategies, as well as to encourage them to create strategies as
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well as they could. The reward offered to participants was in the form of a reasonably large donation
to a popular charity. The amount donated to charity was in line with the amount that would have been
paid in cash.
The game was comprised of 100-200 rounds. The player with the highest-scoring strategy was de-
clared the winning player, as follows:
 
(1  )Material score+ (  Social score)
where  represents the global social coefficient that reflects the social tendency; therefore reflecting
the importance of the social score to overall society.  was set to 1
2
to ensure that players were
motivated by the monetary prize as well by the thought of benefiting others.
In the tournament it was decided to track the players’ materially-motivated scores and socially-
motivated scores as two different scoring groups, rather than tracking the overall score of each player.
The players’ scores in each of these groups were documented in aggregate as each round was played.
Each player’s present state was reflected through his aggregate scores in each of the motivation groups,
along with . Because this method retained the significance of the separate scores, thus indicating the
weight of each player’s social and material motivations, this was believed to be a more effective
method for calculating the dual game used in the study. In this tournament, the payoff amounts were
as follows:
T = 5; R = 3;M1 = M2 = 2:5; P = 1;M
0
1 = M
0
2 = S = 0
The tournament also had a number of further restrictions:
• The social coefficient of every participant was represented by a fixed, distinct number from the
set f0; 0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8; 1g.
• Because people rarely alter their ethical beliefs to a great degree in a small time period, the
social coefficient of an agent was only able to rise by 0:2 per round.
• Players were not allowed to try to collaborate immediately following a drop in their social
coefficient after having defected; nor were they allowed to try to defect immediately following
a collaboration which increased their social coefficient.
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Gao [Gao12] used reinforcement learning theory to propose the most effective strategy as the winning
strategy out of almost two-dozen possible strategies.
A Reinforcement Learning Based Strategy for the Double Game Prisoner’s Dilemma
Founded on a reinforcement learning rule, Gao’s strategy [Gao12] is highly appropriate in situations
where the other players in repeated games are not known to the player. This is because there is no
obligation to provide a framework of a player’s environment in Gao’s strategy.
The theory of reinforcement learning stems from the concept that when moves are associated with
desirable outcomes, the likelihood that a player will perform those moves will increase. Similarly,
a move that is associated with unwanted outcomes is less likely to be performed. Reinforcement
learning entails two processes: firstly, the updating of the social coefficient; and secondly, the player
deciding on an action.
Therefore, the social coefficient will initially be updated according to the Prisoner’s Dilemma double
game payoff matrix, along with the previous actions taken by each of the players. Once this has taken
place, reinforcement learning is used to modify the other player’s actions during the stage in which
the player decides on an action.
Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
9.1 Summary
Game theory can be used to analyze as well as predict human behaviour in several strategic situations.
The main contribution of this work is to build appropriate mathematical methods using game theory
to simulate the behaviour of opponents, and to understand its dominant factors in order to build more
realistic models. We address these issues through the introduction of a novel model in game theory
called multi-games. In multi-games, a given number of players divide up their resources according
to different weights for a given number of games, which are then played out simultaneously. All
players play at the same time but each can use the same set of strategies for the games. Players use a
particular assortment of weights, one for each of the games. Combined, these signify the percentage of
the players’ investment in each of the games. The convex combination of the payoff a player acquired
in the games, along with the assigned weights, makes up a player’s total payoff. Within multi-games,
basic games can be thought of as alternative environments for the players. It can be argued that
investments in the global economy (in terms of various markets) can be modelled as multi-games. A
certain class of Bayesian games is achieved when players’ weights for certain multi-games involve
private information or types that have certain conditional probability distributions.
We have shown that for the class of so-called completely pure regular multi-games with finite sets
of types, the Nash equilibria of basic games can be used to compute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
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for multi-games, with complexity independent of the number of the types and actions. Following the
presentation of the main results, this thesis presented two algorithms for the purpose of establishing
whether we have a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that can be determined with lower computational
complexity.
9.2 Future Work
In this section we identify three possible future directions or work.
Although, throughout this work, some of the results have been proved for pure Bayesian Nash equi-
libria, future work leading on from our research will mainly be focused on extending the multi-games
to compute mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in N-player multi-games.
Another challenging question is if we can reduce the complexity of computing a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for a pure regular (but not completely pure regular) multi-game.
Furthermore, we will consider a particular class of the multi-games in which the payoff for player
i 2 I = f1; :::; Ng not only depends on i but also depends on the other players’ types. This
framework can be used for modelling economic, human or technological behaviour in scenarios where
each player can allocate their resources in varying proportions in order to play in a number of different
environments. However, the payoff for each player is assumed to be the convex linear combination
of payoffs obtained for the basic games, weighted by allocated proportions to their own and other
players’ weights. In other words, the purpose of using this model is to add a new dimension to multi-
games by linearly combining the payoff matrices of various games and linking them through the use
of all players’ types for each player. This then represents the amount of investment that a player is
willing to commit in that particular game when considering their own and other players’ weights.
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